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This thesis investigates the identity building within the third-generation members of an 
immigrant community in Turkey, a group whose grandparents immigrated from the former 
Yugoslavia to Turkey following the Free Migrant Agreement of 1953. The focus community 
immigrated to Turkey without knowing the language; however, they lost their mother 
tongue, a dialect of Macedonian, within two generations and blended into the wider 
Turkish society. Nevertheless, the discourse of being immigrants is still prevalent even in 
the third generation. The existing literature on this topic concentrates on the reasons for 
Balkan immigration to Turkey and its effects on the lives of first-generation immigrants. 
Little is known about the impact of immigration on subsequent generations. With the 
analysis of the data I have collected through field research including in-depth interviews 
and participant observation; I have come to the conclusion that three main factors were 
visible on the narratives of immigrant identity younger generations have; the political 
environment during the time of immigration, exclusion, and discrimination that the first-
generation faced when they immigrated to Turkey, and the current political atmosphere in 
Turkey. 
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Chapter 1.  
One of the earliest memories of my childhood is of a time when a teacher in my 
elementary school asked us after the summer break how we had spent our time, had we 
traveled anywhere, or seen anything new. Izmir, the city I grew up in, has a large 
population of migrants from rural areas of Turkey. When all of my classmates talked about 
“visiting the village,” I felt alone as I had not left the city during the summer. When I went 
home that afternoon, I asked my mother why we didn’t go to our village. I knew we also 
had a village, Gorno Vranofca (Vranovci). My grandfather’s brother had taught me that it 
was our village. It was a fantasy land with waterfalls, a great old plane tree, and beautiful 
mills, but we never talked about going there. It was as if that land was real in only fairy 
tales. That was the day I learned our village was, in fact, real, but was far away, across 
borders. Without passports and visas, we were not able to visit our village. Through small 
events like this, I began to learn who is an immigrant and who is not. I was born and raised 
in Turkey, and both of my parents were as well. I observed, however, that the memories 
of my family’s and many of our neighbors’ immigration to Turkey were still alive and 
affected the ways that subsequent generations understood and constructed their 
identities. Remembering is not an individual act occurring in a vacuum; it requires a “social 
framework” (Halbwachs 2016). It is not just that personal experiences such as what I had 
been through when I was a kid, but also the experiences of earlier generations affected 
subsequent generations’ knowledge of this immigration and shaped their understanding 
of the world.  With these in mind as my starting point, for this thesis, I decided to investigate 
the questions of how and why third-generation descendants of Vranovcians still maintain 
an immigrant identity.  
 It was rare for a student of International Relations to not take a course on 
immigration, especially in Turkey during the Refugee Crisis of the 2010s. However, I 
purposefully avoided that until the last year in my undergraduate program. I was afraid to 
delve into a topic that could easily become overly personal. At the same time, I knew I 
needed to overcome that fear, not just for the sake of learning about the world I live in, but 
to learn about my ancestors’ experiences, and to learn about myself.   
That is how I found myself in a class on the Politics of International Migration. At 
our first class meeting, the professor, Dr. Kolbaşı-Muyan, asked us to define who is an 
immigrant. My answer was crystal clear, I was an immigrant. My whole family was 
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immigrants. However, the class discussion led me to question the label I had been using 
without questioning it beforehand. The discussion in the first class shattered my 
preconceived ideas regarding the effects of my family’s experience. Is a grandchild of an 
immigrant still an immigrant? What makes a group of descendants of immigrants no longer 
feel like they are immigrants, but still tied to the place of origin? The starting point of 
immigration could be clear, but when does the “immigrantness” end? In which generation? 
I left the classroom with new questions.   
 With the decline and following collapse of the Ottoman Empire, human movement, 
either forced or not, from the Balkans and as well as from Caucasus to Anatolia became 
a very frequent phenomenon for the Turkish and Muslim population of the geographies 
even to this day. I am the grandchild of a family that emigrated from Gorno Vranovci, 
Chashka, Macedonia to Izmir, Turkey, after the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1953, also 
known as the Free Migrant Agreement, came into effect. During the 1950s, nearly 140,000 
Muslim people of different ethnic backgrounds emigrated from what was then Yugoslavia 
to Turkey, according to Turkish immigration statistics (cited in Pezo, 2018). According to 
Erken, the unofficial numbers are up to 400,000 people (2018). When it comes to the 
numbers of descendants of immigrants from Gorno Vranovci, unofficial data from 
Hafızoğlu (1996) suggests that there were more than 7000 living in Izmir in the year 1989. 
Many of the grandchildren of these immigrants also see themselves as immigrants, even 
though both they and their parents are Turkish citizens who were born and raised in 
Turkey.   
 The questions I raise in this thesis are personal, but they also have relevance for 
the sociology of citizenship and belonging in multicultural societies. The main question of 
my thesis is actually one of the existential questions that I pose to myself: Why do I and 
others of my generation see ourselves as immigrants? How does the experience of 
immigration continue to be felt by people who were born and raised in Turkey? Is there a 
linkage between the current political atmosphere in Turkey and our identification? Are the 
ones who identify themselves as immigrants anomalies, or were they the majority of the 
third generation? And if so, why?   
 With this thesis, I investigate the practices and institutions that have encouraged 
third-generation members of my community to continue to identify themselves as 
immigrants. In particular, I examine the narratives of second and third generations to 
understand the multi-generational immigrant identity. Their narratives, in this case, are 
shaped by several factors, including the political environment during the time of 
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immigration, exclusion, and discrimination that the first-generation faced when they 
immigrated to Turkey, and the current political atmosphere in Turkey. I believe these three 
elements come together to create an opportunity for immigrants to alternate identities to 
suit their particular and shifting situations and to simultaneously think of themselves as 
Turkish, a national identity, and Macedonian, a transnational immigrant one.   
 Before detailing my research questions, I have to provide some background about 
the group of people who provide my case study. The focal community consists of people 
whose parents or grandparents immigrated to Turkey in the 1950s from a village of 
Macedonia called Gorno Vranovci and eventually settled in İzmir. They immigrated without 
knowing any Turkish. However, the group lost their mother tongue, Macedonian, within 
two generations and largely blended into the wider Turkish society. There are debates 
over the ethnic identity and label of this group. They are alternately considered to be of 
Torbesh descent, Slavic Muslims, or Turkish. During the summer and fall of 2019, I 
interviewed second and third-generation descendants of immigrants from Gorno Vranovci 
about their knowledge and memories of immigration. The community differs from most of 
the other Balkan immigrant groups in Turkey. They immigrated under conditions of the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement, they were considered Free Migrants, meaning they abandoned 
their Yugoslav citizenship rights and were free to settle in any city in Turkey. Unlike some 
other immigrants to Turkey, the Free Migrants did not receive any governmental support 
for relocation or integration. Of course, whether their decision to immigrate was complete 
of their free will is debatable; and the lack of support from either state is still remembered 
today.  
 As a third-generation immigrant, the field site where I conducted research is the 
neighborhoods I grew up in. This came with both opportunities and challenges. As an 
insider, I had relatively easy access to solidarity organizations and prominent residents, 
and I was able to attend intimate events such as weddings and Eid feasts. At the same 
time, I needed to remain alert to the ways that I had normalized the immigrant perspective 
and question many of my everyday routines and assumptions.   
 I adopted a new way of looking at things to overcome the problem of recognizing 
signifiers of immigrant identity, as I was born and raised in the immigrant neighborhood 
myself and surrounded by immigrants until I left home to attend university. I called this 
new way of observing; “the gaze of a toddler.”  The curiosity of toddlers is often beyond 
adult comprehension, but I believe we all need to be inspired by their enthusiasm for 
ordinary things. I found that by adopting the curiosity and questioning characteristic of 
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toddlers, I was able to question even the most mundane things that occurred among my 
family and other immigrants. I was able to see some of the ways that people without first-
hand experience of immigration enacted and experience immigrantness. That new and 
adjusted way of looking was hard to keep up and I sometimes became tired and frustrated, 
but it gave me a new perspective on the world of immigrants while holding onto my insider 
position. 
 “The gaze of toddler” helped me move beyond passively observing the 
environments I was in and allowed me to recognize the everyday practices that are 
signifiers of identity. For example, growing up, I heard lots of Salat al-Janazah, which is 
the special call of prayer for the funeral ritual that occurs when a Muslim person dies. At 
the end of the prayer, Imam says the dead person’s name three times, so that everyone 
can hear who died and for whom the ritual will be held. I had never paid attention to how 
the imam announces the dead person’s name. When I started my fieldwork, I realized for 
the first time that when a first or second-generation1 person dies the imam’s 
announcement includes the person’s Macedonian surname in addition to their legal 
Turkish name, an indication that Macedonian surnames continue to serve as a statement 
of family ties to Macedonia.  The toddler gaze helped me recognized other important 
elements for the reproduction of an immigrant identity among the younger generations, 
such as the effects of rising political Islam in Turkey on an identity tied with Turkishness 
through Islam, which I investigate in Chapter 4. Furthermore, it helped me recognize 
differences between generations such as how second and third generations created 
different ways of enacting immigrant, Turkish, and Muslim identities.  
In addition to participant observation, I interviewed nine people, five from the 
second generation and four from the third. My goal was to interview one member of the 
second generation and one member of the third generation in the same family. I recruited 
my interviewees with two methods; either through reaching out to them using my networks 
or through a post on the Facebook page of a group for Vranovcian descendants living in 
Izmir with more than 1300 members. Though the post about my thesis attracts attention 
from the members of the group, finding actually willing participants through these methods 
was harder. I interviewed one second-generation (Naci) and one third-generation (Işıl) 
through this channel; and unfortunately, in both cases, I couldn’t speak with any other 
                                                
1 As the age group of 3rd generation is relatively younger (20s to 40s), death is still a rare occasion 
for them. I have never witnessed a younger generations’ Salah; therefore, I am not sure if this 
tradition of Macedonian surnames will continue with them. 
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family members. My father’s social capital became an important resource for me during 
recruiting. One of my second-generation interviewees, Muammer; is a prominent figure 
among the Vranovcian descendants. He was a high-ranking state official in education for 
a long time and became a politician during his retirement years. I reached him through my 
father’s connections in the immigrant circles and my father played the role of a mediator 
in most cases when I asked participants to join the research. Furthermore, I wanted to 
interview one of my distant uncles, Kadri, as he had worked in the traditional neighborhood 
through his life and never needed to leave the bubble for economic purposes, compared 
with lots of his age-mates. My father played an immense role while recruiting him. 
Therefore, my father was present in my interviews with Naci, Kadri, Dayı (a pseudonym), 
and Tayfun. I interviewed my father, too; in order to create a suitable environment for him 
to share his perspective related to the immigration of his parents so that his engagement 
with the interviewees during the interviews would be limited and he wouldn’t affect the 
perspective of the participants. I wanted to pair him with my close cousin, Tayfun; as my 
grandfather, my father, and Tayfun shared the same household while he was growing up 
and it would be easier for me to investigate the transmission of memories in their case. In 
a number of cases, other people were present during the interview. For example, in Kadri’s 
case, we had some visitors like his wife, his brother, and his sister-in-law; in addition to 
my father’s presence. Furthermore, they also wanted to be a part of the conversation and 
answer some of my questions, after getting their verbal consent to participate in the study, 
I had them join the conversation. I interviewed Muammer, Burcu, Işıl, and Özen in a café 
environment, individually, by myself. I met Muammer after a bureaucratic meeting for a 
sister-cities agreement between Chashka Municipality, which is the main region of 
Vranovci, and Çiğli Municipality; which is the home of traditional immigrant neighborhoods 
in Izmir. Other prominent figures of the community were present while I interviewed him, 
though they didn’t want to join the conversation except for some dialogues regarding the 
etymology of some words Muammer mentioned.   
 The interviews with members of the second generation were crucial for 
understanding how the experiences of the first-generation immigrants were and are 
transmitted to the third generation through their parents. From all of the interviews, I aimed 
to learn more about the collective memories of the immigration experience and what has 
been forgotten; in difficult experiences forgotten things are also valuable. As part of my 
participant observation, I documented the atmosphere of the traditional neighborhoods 
that are the homes to the second generation. Many still live in the places where their family 
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first settled and they are well connected with the other immigrants in the neighborhood. 
Interviews with the third generation were a crucial part of the research project, as I hoped 
to answer the question of whether or not the third generation see themselves as 
“immigrants.” Moreover, I investigated how the second and third-generation immigrants 
identify themselves in relation to Macedonian, Turkish, Torbesh, and immigrant identities. 
Holding interviews with members of both generations gave me the chance to compare 
differences in what is remembered or forgotten by each generation, acknowledging, 
however, that my sample is small. The interviews also helped me understand the 
transgenerational relations in the immigrant families, and how the second and first-
generation affected the younger generation approach to immigrantness.  
 While planning the research, what I had in my mind was an individual interview 
with a third-generation immigrant followed by a group interview that included the first 
person and a closely related older relative. However, I could not reach this ideal for all of 
my interviews. In some cases, there was not an available and willing family member from 
the other generation, or if there was, their schedules did not match.  I, nonetheless, 
managed to interview three pairs three of second and third-generation immigrants in the 
same families, which gives me some valuable insights into the transmission of memories, 
practices of traditions, and even the effects of discriminatory incidents on the households 
as a whole.   
 The interviews were loosely structured to allow me to better understand 
participants’ life stories and to permit them to present their narratives in a way that made 
sense to them. I asked them to describe what they knew about their grandparents’ 
experience of immigration to Turkey and to reflect on ways that they identify with their 
grandparents’ story. To probe for events that might have been “forgotten,” I asked both 
second and third-generation participants if they had any knowledge or stories about 
specific events or experiences. I also asked them what some words mean to them 
including the Torbesh identity; which led me to find out that Torbeshness was almost 
completely forgotten among my third-generation participants (see Chapter 4).   
 My starting point for this project and main research question was understanding 
the ways that memories of immigration transmitted across generations contribute to the 
identities of descendants born long after the event. From that point, it grew into exploring 
the specific social and political circumstances faced by each generation that allowed the 
immigrant identity to persist or (re)appear in this community. As Pezo explains, 
immigration affects the collective memory of communities deeply, especially in the cases 
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where the movements are forced or the line between voluntary and forced migration is 
blurred such as the case for the focal group, whose movement might be even considered 
as a de facto forced migration. Even though it lacked open violence, the dissimilative and 
suppressive methods of the Yugoslavian state “encouraged” Muslim people to emigrate 
(Pezo, 2018). Hence, one of my questions was whether or not they felt their ancestors’ 
movement was obligatory, whether members of this third-generation regard their family’s 
emigration from Yugoslavia as forced or voluntary. In Chapter Two, I describe the 
historical background of immigration and its effects on the third generation.   
 From the outset, I felt that it would be important to understand the historical context 
of the 1950s migration from Macedonia to Turkey and wanted to know how members of 
the third generation remembered and identified with that event. However, after my field 
research, I realized the effects of the political environment of the 1950s were not direct, 
but only visible in indirect elaboration, such as seeing Turkey as an abundant country due 
to Marshall Plan. In the next chapter, I present these indirect effects by setting individual, 
family histories in the historical context of the 1950s placing specific emphasis on the 
political atmosphere of the early Cold War. I, thus, examine similarities and differences 
among families and generations to understand the effects of the political atmosphere of 
the time on individuals’ lives.   
 I also questioned to what extent and how Macedonian immigrants experienced 
exclusion from the broader Turkish society. Here, I try to explore the transmission of the 
memories of exclusion and discrimination, especially, by the first generation to understand 
whether and how this affected the expectations of the third generation. Through interviews 
and observations, I learned of memories of xenophobia and memories related to 
language; either discrimination due to language differences or tragicomic 
misunderstandings that still affect the younger generation’s self-identification, even though 
most of them do not know the Macedonian language. On the other hand, exclusion and 
discrimination resulted in assimilation in some cases, and I believe the most important 
factor for the disappearance of the mother tongue is the internalizing of language-related 
discrimination. Discrimination based on language use varied from direct structural 
intervention by state-supported campaigns such as the “Citizen! Speak Turkish” campaign 
discussed in Chapter 3 to individual acts of racism, which are very much connected. This 
kind of discrimination resulted in self-policing, such as prohibiting the usage of the 
Macedonian language at homes by first or second generations in order to prevent the 
younger generations from learning it, and so that they would speak Turkish as their mother 
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tongue without a noticeable accent. Hence, exclusion and discrimination had two radically 
different effects on the descendants; either creating a whole identity around those traumas 
or leaving everything related to it. I investigate both outcomes in detail giving specific 
emphasis to language-related discrimination in Chapter 3. Aside from some rare cases of 
open violence and language-related discrimination, I also consider the ways that 
responses of the community to discrimination became boundary markers, some of which 
are maintained or at least remembered by members of the third generation. Also in 
Chapter 3, I describe how marital rules and hygiene practices act as boundary markers. 
 Last, but certainly not least, as a result of the interviews and observations, I 
realized there were differences in the ways that the second and third-generations connect 
themselves to memories of immigration. I suspected that the current political atmosphere 
in Turkey plays a significant role in the adoption of the immigrant identity for the younger 
generations, and maybe influences the ways that they repeat the stories of immigrations 
told by their parents and grandparents. Hence, I analyzed my interviews and observations 
counting the current political atmosphere in to examine its effects on the self-identification 
of third generations compare to second generations.  
 For most of the first and second-generation Macedonian immigrants, Islam was 
their bridge to connect with Turkish identity. The connection was visible in some of the 
phrases they use, casually without giving a second thought, such as “Alhamdulillah2, we 
are Turkish.” On the other hand, the community identifies modernity and secularism as 
two of their main characteristics, especially when they are asked about their approach to 
religion. For both the first and second generations, this bridge to Turkishness through 
Islam had not created any existential problems, as the zeitgeist of their upbringing still 
included laicism as one of the main elements of statehood in Turkey. However, most of 
the third-generation immigrants spent nearly all of their lives or at least their teenage and 
adult lives under political Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP from now on) rule. 
The rise of political Islam coupled with neoliberalism led the country into an economic and 
social crisis, which made opposition and, especially secular groups concerned both in their 
daily lives and for the future of the country. These changes might have affected the 
younger generations as the approach to religion that they learned from their families was 
                                                
2 Alhamdulillah literally means “Thank God.’’ The phrase is used in varied ways such as being 
thankful for abundance, wealth etc. However, the main use of the phrase involves being thankful 
for being a Muslim, when asked if someone is Muslim or not, and especially to express thankfulness 
at being born into a Muslim family.  (Alhamdulillah, we are Muslim.) The interesting point is most of 
the first and second generation immigrants use the phrase to express their Turkishness.  
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not seen as acceptable Islam by this hegemonic political power. Furthermore, as their ties 
with national identity were built by their religious identity, ironically in a laicist paradigm, 
an attack on the legitimacy of their Muslimness meant also an attack on their Turkishness. 
 According to Baris Ünlü’s “Turkishness Contract,” historically the main element of 
Turkishness is being Muslim (Ünlü, 2018: 166). For many minority ethnic communities in 
Turkey, including Laz people, Bosnians, Albanians, etc., Islam was their bridge to 
Turkishness3. With the increasing oppressiveness of AKP and the growth of political Islam, 
secular Muslims like the Macedonian immigrants faced an existential crisis. This was 
especially true for the younger generations, causing them to question their religious and 
national identities. In this aspect, I have considered whether losing ties with Muslimness 
and having a strong connection with secularism triggered a loss of Turkishness and 
strengthened their immigrant identities. I take up Ünlü’s idea of a crisis of Turkish identity 
in Chapter 4 to examine the effects of political Islam on young generations' feelings of 
national attachment. Ünlü was primarily concerned with the relationship of Kurds to 
Turkishness; I extend his analysis of a crisis of Turkish identity to include effects of political 
Islam on young secular ethnic minority citizens.   
 In these three chapters, I explore how and why the third-generation members of 
the community still consider themselves immigrants. In Chapter 5, I explore the complexity 
of identities expressed by members of the third generation, and how those identities work 
together, affect each other, and change in importance to individuals from time to time and 
from place to place. As an example, a third-generation immigrant could identify as an 
immigrant, which is a transnational identity with a potential to be greater than the sum of 
its mixture, and in the case for my participants, a tie to Europeanness, or as Turkish if they 
want to or see a need to do that. This flexibility and interchangeability in identity choice 
might have been a demeanour the immigrants sometimes use to their benefit. In Chapter 
6, with the conclusion, I will also analyze the position of immigrants and younger 
generations in relation to time and space.  
According to O’Reilly, in order to understand the global atmosphere and the 
political and economic dynamics that are involved with migration, comprehensive research 
should be conducted on both the macro level, which includes historical studies, and on 
the micro-level, which is more interested in daily lives of immigrants and their own 
narratives of movement (O’Reilly, 2015). With the three chapters and analysis of the 
                                                
3 I should note that this process was different for Kurdish people, and is discussed by Ünlü (2018: 
256).  
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positionality of the third-generation immigrants and the dimensions of identity they might 
embrace, my goal is an analysis that includes both macro and micro aspects of the 
intergenerational memories of migration. The first and third chapters, which concern 
historical, economic, and political questions, are mainly focused on the macro level. 
Chapters two and four concern the intimate and personal ways that the immigrants live 
and tell their family stories of migration. I consider which of the memories transmitted to 
subsequent generations and then remolded in ways that respond to current affairs. 
Examining all four chapters’ outcomes at the conclusion, I review the reasons 
behind the identity choices of third generations to open a discussion on locality and its 
effects on identity compared to temporality, and generational transmission of memories 
visible on narratives of the younger generations. With the outcomes of this discussion, I 
conclude by raising the question of when the immigrantness ends. Without a doubt, this 
project started as a form of self-exploration. My aim with this project, however, has been 
to move beyond self-centeredness to examine the relation between structures and 
individual lives; especially in the case of immigration which seems to continue to trigger 
experiences that transcend generations for people all around the world. 
 
11 
Chapter 2.  
“One day, I looked around me, and the whole village was empty. 
Everyone packed their belongings and they were just gone.” 
-- My father, quoting a 
person who stayed in the village after 
the emigration waves. 
 In this chapter, I focus on the Gentlemen’s Agreement between Yugoslavia and 
Turkey, and the role it played in the Gorno Vranovcians’ immigration to Turkey. I first 
discuss the geopolitics of the 1950s in relation to the two states. Second, I present the 
narratives of my participants in relation to the historical conditions in which their parents 
or grandparents decided to immigrate. Lastly, I examine how those historical conditions 
are still remembered by the descendants, how those memories were transmitted through 
generations, and how the third-generation participants of the study reflect on these 
memories in relation to their identities. 
2.1. Political Landscape in the 1950s 
After World War II, the Cold War of the 1950s marked the beginning of a new 
power balance in the world. This contest between powers affected all countries in the 
world, though not exactly in the same ways. The political atmosphere in the 1950s 
triggered a mass human movement from the former Yugoslavia to Turkey. According to 
Ağanoğlu, citing Yücelden, more than 175 thousand people immigrated to Turkey from 
Yugoslavia between 1952 to 1967, with the main flow being between 1954 to 1962 
(Ağanoğlu, 2001: 328).  
 The immigration of Macedonian Muslims to Turkey started with the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement of 1953, an unwritten agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey regarding 
the regulation of immigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey (Pezo, 2018). According to 
Gentlemen’s Agreement, individuals who wanted to emigrate to Turkey first applied to 
renounce their Yugoslav citizenship and then declared themselves as being “of Turkish 
descent and culture4” to receive their Turkish citizenship at the consulate in Skopje (294). 
                                                
4 The settlement Law of 1934: “Accepted are individual settlers of Turkish origin (Türk soyundan) 
or nomadic individuals who want to enter the country from abroad with the aim of settling in Turkey, 
together with settlers or nomadic individuals and tribes which are of Turkish origin, as well as those 
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Ethnic background was important in this process; however, Turkish policymakers believed 
some groups were more suitable than others for assimilation (Schad, 2016). As such, 
Bosniaks and Torbeshes were given priority, while immigration to Turkey was harder for 
some others such as Albanians. Pezo states that according to Turkish sources, nearly 
140,000 Slavic and non-Slavic Muslims emigrated from southern parts of Yugoslavia to 
Turkey in the 1950s; 120,000 of them between 1954 and 1958 (284).   
 The socio-political changes occurring in the newly socialist Yugoslavia affected its 
internal decision-making regarding emigration. In addition to its political maneuvering 
between East and West, post-war Yugoslavia had to balance the interests and demands 
of different groups within the state. It was also under heavy pressure created by 
industrialization, land reform, and agricultural changes, with state intervention in every 
aspect of everyday life (Pezo, 2018, 288). The changing economic system affected large 
landowners as well as merchants and craftsmen in urban parts, many of whom emigrated 
for better economic opportunities. Pezo states that the first emigrants with Gentlemen’s 
Agreement were urban Muslims, who were mainly merchants and craftsmen, suggesting 
that they were greatly affected by the economic changes. Pezo describes the main push 
elements behind this movement of people as economic but does not discount security 
concerns and religious pressure. He further examines the role of state violence in an 
operation to confiscate weapons in 1955-56 and argues that large-scale state violence 
became a push factor, especially for Albanians. The author acknowledges that violence 
was neither the intended outcome nor the main reason for emigration, yet it had a 
remarkable impact on the collective memory of the Muslim groups in the region (291).  
In addition to the socio-political changes in Yugoslavia, the geopolitics of the Cold 
War also created a suitable environment for this human movement (Erken 2018). 
Following the Tito-Stalin split, and especially after the Soviet military mobilization in 
Hungary in 1956, Yugoslavia felt threaten and sought military back up, bringing them 
closer to the Western bloc. After 1945, Turkey was also looking for tools to overcome its 
security concerns, which were in parallel with Yugoslavia’s. Hence, with the support of the 
US, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia came together in 1951 and started the negotiations 
which led to the Balkan Pact in 1953 (ibid. 942). Yet, as Pezo (2018) observes, geopolitical 
                                                
settlers who are connected to Turkish culture (Türk kültürüne bağlı), and wish to enter on condition 
of obtaining the opinion of the Ministry of Interior (and on its command), on condition of obtaining 
the opinion of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, by virtue of this Act and by order of the Ministry 
of Health and Social Assistance. These [individuals] are called refugees (Muhacir).” Translated by 
Schad, 2016. 
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factors could be felt differently at the grassroots. For example, with the death of Stalin 
(also in 1953) Yugoslavia’s ties to Balkan Pact states were loosened and relations with 
the Eastern bloc were re-established, increasing fear of the state among Muslim groups. 
To understand how the state’s internal security concerns might trigger massive 
emigration waves, the concept of “demographic engineering” might be useful. Thomas 
Schad examined the migration of Muslims living in the southern regions of Yugoslavia to 
Turkey during the interwar period through this framework (Schad, 2016). The concept of 
demographic engineering comes out of Conflict Resolution Studies and is used as an 
analytical tool to describe state violence against minorities. Demographic engineering 
includes assimilative methods as well as dissimilative methods such as genocide or ethnic 
cleansing to reach a certain goal, such as national homogenization (431).  Schad points 
to Yugoslavia’s aim to homogenize “Southern Serbia” by forcing Albanians to migrate to 
Turkey, as they were believed to be the “enemies of the state,” with potential allegiances 
to Albania. In the case of Turkey, he underlines that Turkey was still suffering from the 
population loss that resulted from the population exchange between Greece and Turkey 
in 1923. Turkey’s Settlement Law of 1934 was enlarged the next year to accept non-
Turkish speaking Muslims if they felt “connected to the Turkish culture,” with immediate 
assimilation of the incoming groups. Turkish administrators believed that ethnically Turkish 
people and Sunni Muslims who were “connected to Turkish culture” could be loyal to the 
state. In 1938, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed an agreement to regulate migration. 
According to Schad, the main reasons for this agreement were security concerns for both 
states, as they regarded some groups as loyal to the state and others as potential enemies 
of the state, and wanted to consolidate a loyal population. His application of the term 
“demographic engineering” as a framework of investigating states’ policies of national 
homogenization in order to reach security aims is suitable for the case of Yugoslavia and 
Turkey not just for the interwar period, but also for the period after WWII, as the security 
concerns of the respective states continued.   
 Erken (2018) asserts that the Gentlemen Agreement should be investigated in this 
historical framework and underlines that Yugoslavia sought to emigrate to Albanians and 
Turks as early as 1938 because they were Muslims, non-Slavic, and believed to be loyal 
to other states. Schad comes to a similar conclusion with respect to the 1938 migration, 
arguing that even though the inter-war state was changed, its ethno-political motives and 
security concerns did not. Furthermore, in contrast to Pezo; Erken says that Yugoslavia 
did not use violence to encourage emigration, but left the decision to stay or go to its 
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citizens. Erken argues that as “Free Migrants,” the ultimate decision to emigrate was the 
individuals’ to make (944). Overall, Erken underlines the impact of foreign policy and 
security concerns in the Cold War as the framework of the migration between Yugoslavia 
and Turkey. However, he states just focusing on this aspect is an oversimplification; 
hence, he also underlines the importance of investigating the nationalist policy approach 
of Yugoslavia as well as Muslim minorities' hesitance to be a part of Yugoslavia (Erken, 
2018 p. 950). In this sense, his interpretation sits between Pezo’s emphasis on the 
restrictions faced by Muslims in Yugoslavia and Schad’s focus on the state’s efforts at 
demographic engineering.   
 It is also important to understand Yugoslav emigrants’ reasons for choosing Turkey 
as their destination. According to Düzgün (2019), the 1950s was the time when the Turkish 
economic system finally transitioned to capitalism. Despite one hundred years of 
modernization beginning in the late Ottoman Empire, it was only in the 1950s that all of 
the factors were in place for capitalism to be fully adopted by the Turkish economic 
structure. According to Düzgün, the Cold War created a suitable environment for the 
Turkish state to trigger capitalist relations of production, as the country came into the 
geopolitical orbit of the United States. The US exerted its influence on the country through 
the Marshall Plan and by encouraging tax and other policies that accelerated the country’s 
transition to capitalism. This created an image of Turkey as prosperous in many people’s 
minds, a factor that is often ignored in much of the literature describing the reasons behind 
the mostly Muslim country’s historical ties with the Balkans. 
 Several authors concerned with the Muslim minority’s emigration from Yugoslavia 
during the 1950s examine religious pressure on the minorities as one of the main reasons 
for the emigration. Ağanoğlu lists restrictions on celebrating religious holidays, arbitrary 
detentions of people who attended mosque gatherings, and the closure of religious 
schools as some of the aspects of this religious pressure (2001). Pezo also identifies the 
religious pressure Muslims felt following the state’s regulation of religion including closures 
of Islamic schools and a ban on celebrating Mawlids (the birthday of the Prophet 
Muhammed) as a motivating factor for the emigration.   
 Another important factor noted by several authors is the Yücel Incident, the trial, 
and execution of young, well-educated, Turkish nationalists and Muslims labeled by 
Yugoslavia as terrorists. The Yücel Organisation was established in 1941 to preserve 
Turkish and Muslim identity through cultural activities. After the establishment of 
Yugoslavia at the end of the First World War, nationalist movements were seen as a threat 
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to the integrity of the new country. In 1948, the Yücel Organisation was labeled as a 
terrorist organization and its leaders were tried and some were executed. This incident 
helped shape the Turkish minority’s mindset and was an important element in their 
decision to emigrate according to Çalışkan (2014) and Ağanoğlu (2001). The trial of 
members of the Yucel Organisation was regarded throughout the Skopje region as a kind 
of psychological warfare, according to Ağanoğlu (2001). However, this historic event 
seems to have been totally forgotten by the descendants of Vranovcians in Turkey or 
maybe never had a big impact, as none of my participants mentioned the incident, 
suggesting differentiation among the Turkish and Muslim minority of Yugoslavia. Çalışkan 
(2014) also reports that the Turkish minority in Yugoslavia had a negative perception of 
Tito and Yugoslavia compared to other Yugoslav ethnic groups.   
 The data I collected among Vranovcians differed considerably from the sentiments 
reported by Çalışkan. My respondents reported generally positive or neutral views of 
Yugoslavia; with negative sentiments being rare. A good example of two different 
interpretations of the same event can be seen with respect to bans on the usage of the 
veil. For example, one of Çalışkan’s participants, who was a distant relative of a member 
of the organization, attributed a quotation, “Even your father5 bans it, why are you coming 
at us?” to Tito. This respondent interpreted the statement as discrimination against their 
Muslimness. In contrast, one of my participants attributed the same quotation to an 
ordinary Yugoslav soldier who is said to have warned his aunt to stop wearing the veil. 
The respondent who relayed this story to me did so with a warm voice, and he expressed 
pride at the soldier’s mention of Atatürk and the modernization process. Cevizci overlooks 
differences between the Turkish minority and Vranovcians, and similar to the Turkish 
state’s perspective, she sees Vranovcians as sharing Turkish descent and culture, having 
similar characteristics with broader Turkish society, without explaining those similarities 
(Cevizci, 2007). However, rural Vranovcians were distinct from the Turkish minority in the 
Balkans, especially from urban-Turks, which I explore in detail in Chapter 3. In the 
following section, I present my participants’ remarks about their parents’ or grandparents’ 
decisions to leave Yugoslavia for Turkey. 
Before moving on to the individuals’ histories, I want to give a brief history of the 
village of Gorno Vranovci, the ancestral village of my participants. The village is situated 
in the Chashka region of North Macedonia. It is a mountain village in the Grot “Thunder” 
                                                
5 Refers to Atatürk. 
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hills of Mount Jakupica. During the late stages of the Second World War, the geographical 
location of this distant and rural village allowed it to become a sanctuary for the Partizans 
(Macedonian socialists opposing the Nazis). The Presidium of ASNOM (Anti-fascist 
Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia) was transferred to Gorno Vranovci as 
it was a secure location due to its natural barriers. According to Friedman, the Macedonian 
Muslim residents of the village were sympathetic towards the Partizans, having been 
discriminated against under the pro-fascist Bulgarian occupation (Friedman, 1993). The 
village served as the military and administrative headquarters for the Partizans for a short 
period during 1944, until these organizations transferred to Skopje after that city was 
liberated. However, that short period affected villagers’ memories, especially the ones 
whose houses were used by the Partizans as headquarters and later turned into 
museums. The village also served as a literary hub in that period, being the first place in 
liberated Macedonia to have a printing press and the first issue of Nova Makedonija (New 
Macedonia), a Macedonian daily was published there (Friedman, 1993: Bechev, 2019).  
Most of my research participants, especially the second generation described family 
memories of this period with a sense of pride. This short period might have triggered a 
way of seeing the village as the birthplace of “New Macedonia” within the villagers, which 
is very visible in the lyrics of the Vaska Ilieva’s song “Pesna za Gorno Vranovci”6: 
Far from here, in Veles, in Gorno Vranovci, 
River Vardar flows slowly 
There, our country was born 
There, our country was born, our Macedonia is there. 
2.2. Recalling the Political Landscape of the 1950s in 
Individuals’ Lives: Reasons for Leaving Gorno 
Vranovci for a new life 
 Before moving on to exploring the individual narratives of my participants, I want 
to acknowledge that what is remembered and forgotten can change in relation to changes 
in people’s social, economic, political, and personal positions. The alterations of memory 
especially those related to changes in the political landscape will be examined in detail in 
                                                
6 Pesna Za Gorno Vranovci is Vaska Ilieva’s song in her 1996 album, Imala Majka. She is one of 
the most popular Macedonian folklore singers. The rumors on internet mentioned that she met 
some of the villagers in Germany and found their story very sentimental, wrote this song for them. 
(Vaska Ilieva, Pesna Za Gorno Vranovci https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcitNafwaE0)  
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the next chapters. What is remembered by the second and third generations regarding the 
village and their forebears’ reasons for the immigration is very much in parallel and their 
narratives are of three basic types: firstly, remembered economic conditions of the village; 
secondly, remembered aspects of the political atmosphere of the ‘50s in relation to religion 
and finally to memories of the effects of earlier immigration and the migrant networks. I 
conclude the chapter by examining what is remembered by my participants’ shared 
memories of their families’ relations to the Yugoslavian and Turkish states, in order to 
further analyze the effects of the political atmosphere on their narratives.   
 All but two of my study participants described the economic conditions in the village 
as very poor. The collective picture drawn by the participants regarding the village looks 
like this: A rural village surrounded by mountains with little to no agricultural products other 
than wheat and rice; milling was the main source of income for villagers. Other work 
included picking chestnuts and animal husbandry, although these were not very common 
and most husbandry was only to meet family needs. Even third-generation participants 
still “remember” the poor economic conditions and related hardships as a reason for 
emigration. A third-generation participant who is also my cousin explains: 
Both the young and old were working the mills. In the village, there was not any 
cultivation of wheat. After the wheat was cultivated in some other places, it was 
carried to the village by animals, as there were a lot of water streams in the village, 
the wheat was turned into flour with watermills. It’s said that most of the people 
were working in those mills, and there weren’t many people doing husbandry. 
Agriculture and animal breeding were very limited as it was a mountain village, and 
as the money coming from mills was not enough, and there was a longing for 
Turkey.7 
Some of my participants even mentioned that the villagers were going to nearby villages 
to find employment as field hands. They underscored the difficult conditions of rural life 
such as living in crowded households, producing all their daily goods themselves, and 
working for very little money or even just for bags of flour from the mill. The poverty and 
scarcity with which the village is recalled can be understood from the cuisine my 
participants described.  Each and every one of my participants listed the main and favorite 
dishes of the village as variations of pastries requiring only a limited number of ingredients 
and in some cases, such as valangi, made with only flour, water, and salt. On the contrary, 
their memories of Turkey in the 1950s depict a very prosperous country. Two of the 
                                                
7 I conducted the interviews in Turkish as all of my participants’ and my mother tongue is Turkish 
and translated the transcripts.  
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second-generation and one of the third-generation participants described the Menderes 
(Prime Minister from 1950-60) era in Turkey as a prosperous period in Turkey’s history. 
They emphasized that their ancestors believed immigrating to Turkey would be an 
economic opportunity as it was abundant in agricultural production and had job 
opportunities for them. My cousin, Tayfun explained this in his words: 
…They also overheard about economic prosperity in Turkey. They heard 
about job opportunities. If you check Turkey’s wheat production, Adnan 
Menderes's years are the best ones. There was prosperity in agriculture. 
So, they thought, we should go East, there is prosperity there… 
Furthermore, two of my participants stressed that some young family members in 
the first generation of immigrants had a longing to see Turkey. Before presenting the other 
remembered reasons behind the migration, I want to note that these economic reasons 
are different from the economic reasons generally emphasized in the literature. As I have 
described above, urban-Turks especially was affected by the changing economic system 
in post-war Yugoslavia. However, what Vranovcians suffered was mostly poverty. 
Although some of my participants listed land collectivization, as an economic factor, they 
emphasized that it affected only the rich. Instead, what they remember about the village 
was the lack of educational, health-care, and infrastructural services and employment 
opportunities. Furthermore, my participants report that the lack of these kinds of state 
services made their ancestors feel abandoned, which the descendants tend to interpret 
as a reflection of their minority status.   
 Eight out of nine participants mentioned in one way or another that the political 
atmosphere of the 1950s affected the villagers’ decision to immigrate to Turkey. Most of 
them emphasized that their religious minority status was the main motivator of emigration, 
and especially of the choice of Turkey as the immigration destination. Raids on the village 
during and before WWII are still remembered by the second generation and the stories of 
Chetniks8 attacking the village are still prominent among the immigrants. Most of them 
reported that being Muslim was the main factor that made their ancestors leave the 
                                                
8 According to Oxford Dictionary of Contemporary World History, Chetniks are “Serbian nationalist 
guerrillas who fought to protect the Serbian minorities in Macedonia in the late nineteenth century. 
The name was then adopted by nationalist guerrillas fighting initially with British support during 
World War II against the German and Italian occupying forces. Their operations were concentrated 
in Bosnia and the Serb‐inhabited areas of Croatia. However, they became embroiled in a bitter 
struggle with Tito's Communist partisans, in which they were overcome towards the end of 1944.” 
(2021) 
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country. Some of them shared their personal stories of feeling like an outsider. A member 
of the second generation shared a childhood memory: 
I have a memory of such a thing happening. My dad was a veterinarian 
official in Veles. We took the train together with him from Veles to Chashka. 
We were sitting in the compartment, together with a mom and her daughter. 
The woman gave something to her children to eat. As I was looking at them, 
the lady offered some food to me, too. But my dad hit my hands, as I 
accepted. The food was on the ground. The lady was surprised, and asked 
my dad “What are you doing?” My dad said, “We are Muslim. We do not 
eat pork.” As a kid, I was very embarrassed, because the lady was sorry. 
Being a minority is just different. Well, the people here [Turkey] do not know 
how much it matters to belong to a motherland. If a person is not from a 
minority, they don’t know the importance of motherland. 
Even though these kinds of personal stories are still remembered, only a small number of 
my participants understood them as underlying structural conditions of religious 
oppression that made the villagers consider immigration. Other evidence of structural 
oppression included the resettlement of non-Muslims into neighboring villages, which 
made the Vranovcians afraid to mix with them and feeling left alone and imprisoned in the 
village with no financial support, not enough educational nor infrastructural services from 
the newly established government. These conditions created uncertainty and the villagers 
did not know what to expect from the future. Overall, the connection between remembered 
economic and political reasons for immigration is quite visible.  
 Significantly, my participants provided reasons for their family’s immigration that 
are different from the reasons elaborated in the literature regarding immigration from 
Yugoslavia in the 1950s. My participants did not mention the main themes in the literature 
such as nationalization of land, high taxes for the Turkish minority, bans on hijab-wearing, 
or the trials of Yucel organization members as reasons for emigration. I argue that this 
suggests a differentiation between the Vranovcians and others who emigrated from 
Yugoslavia in the same wave of immigration, or at least what the first generation gave 
importance to was different than other communities that emigrated in the same wave. The 
urban Turkish community that Çalışkan studied remembers the Yücel Organization and 
religious oppression in Yugoslavia as reasons for emigration. As the Vranovcians were a 
rural community, their reasons should be expected to be different from the urban Turkish 
or non-Turkish Muslim communities’ reasons. Before moving on to discuss the 
acceleration of the Vranovcian emigration throughout the 1950s, one should note that 
three of my participants observed even if the immigration had not occurred in the fifties, 
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the village would have shared the fate of the neighboring villages; that is, the youth would 
have left for other parts of Europe, for better education and job opportunities, leaving only 
the elderly in the village. One of my participants, who is a distant relative and whom I 
visited in their home explains it this way: 
…If we’d stayed there, we wouldn’t be here (together), any of us. Some 
would be in Switzerland; some would be in Germany. Everyone would be 
spread across the world. 
Another relative who was present at that moment added their comment: 
In the closest village to ours, Melnica, only the old people live there now. 
All the young people are in Europe, outside of the village. 
Another important factor, but one that is outside the scope of this thesis is that participation 
in the German guest-worker program during the 1960s was very high among first-
generation immigrants. This suggests that the immigrants did not just look for a place to 
be free from political or religious oppression, but were also (or primarily) looking for a place 
that offered more economic opportunities than were available to them in Yugoslavia. A 
second-generation participant explained the mentality of these multiple immigrations as a 
minority from Yugoslavia immigrating to another country hoping to be accepted, but unable 
to find what they were looking for, something I examine in detail in the next chapter:  
Then, the door to Germany was opened. The ones who immigrated to 
Turkey, well, they were “heimatlos” [stateless]. They were heimatlos in 
Yugoslavia, heimatlos in Turkey, so they went to Germany to work. 
Heimatlos again. It’s like you’ve lived in three countries, but you can’t 
describe your motherland, you don’t know which one is your country. It’s 
so hard to live like that. A lot of people went to Germany to work. They got 
their financial power and some of them come back to Turkey. Those people 
are like a lost generation. In the name of younger generations, for you, for 
us, our parents sacrificed themselves. 
 In the 1950s movement of people from the village was facilitated, perhaps even 
accelerated by earlier immigration to Turkey. Eight out of my nine participants mentioned 
the previous immigration of other villagers, especially when I asked why they settled in 
Izmir. They cited letters and visits from a small number of people who immigrated to Izmir 
as early as the late 1920’s describing the new city9. Some mentioned relatives who had 
been to Turkey several times as seasonal workers and returned to the village with stories 
                                                
9 Earlier immigration is mentioned also by Hafızoğlu, 1996.  
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of this new place they visited. Importantly, applicants to the free migrant program needed 
documentation of a “guarantee family” from Turkey (Cevizci, 2007; Hafızoğlu, 1996). 
Therefore, migrant networks were very important to this immigration wave. As Pezo (2018) 
noted, cumulative movement or chain migration became increasingly central; as families 
migrated, their relatives tend to migrate as well. Opening the road to emigrate triggered a 
culture of migration.   
 According to Massey and colleagues, migrant networks are “sets of interpersonal 
ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination 
areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin” (1993: 448). The 
networks established among immigrants and others who considered immigration as an 
option are essential for providing much-needed information regarding job opportunities, 
where to settle, and educational opportunities. These networks reduce the risks and costs 
of immigration, as the earlier immigrants create a safer atmosphere for the new arrivals, 
including helping them deal with culture shock (Yu, 2012; Pruitt, 2014) Although chain 
migration and migrant networks did not start in the 1950s immigration wave, they became 
an accelerator of immigration and for some of the immigrants, chain migration even 
became the reasons of their movement. As their friends and families emigrated, they could 
not stay in the village any longer. The steep drop in population between 1953 and 1961 




Table 1.  Macedonian Census Data, Population of the Republic of Macedonia 
according to the declaration of ethnicity, by settlements, according 
to the population censuses, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994, and 
2002. (Retrieved from MAKStat Database on August 28, 2020) 
 Total Macedonians Albanians Turks Other 
Gorno Vranovci 
(Gorno Vranovci) 1953 
3847 47 2 3780 18 
Gorno Vranovci 
(Chashka)1961 
738 2 209 524 3 
Gorno Vranovci  
(Titov Veles) 1971 
177 1 146 28 2 
Gorno Vranovci  
(Titov Veles) 1981 
184 1 138 39 6 
Gorno Vranovci  
(Titov Veles)1991 
174 2 151 15 6 
Gorno Vranovci  
(Titov Veles) 1994 
221 1 207 11 2 
Gorno Vranovci 
(Chashka)2002 
199 1 189 9 0 
Note for the table: According to Erken, citing from Kut (2005) and Baklacıoğlu (2010); the fluidity between these ethnicity 
options was visible; especially between Muslim identities, such as Turkish to Albanian or the other way (2018). 
Furthermore; registering under certain identities to gain benefits was also frequent, for example in order to be eligible for 
the migration wave in the 50s one should be registered as Turkish. In the case of Vranovci; the rising number of Albanian 
population after the main emigration wave was explained by the participants of this study as Albanians from near regions 
buying summer houses (Dachas) in the village and some of the families settling for husbandry. Işıl, even noted that her 
family members visiting the village saw Albanian flags in front of some houses. 
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 Before examining my participants’ perspectives of Turkey and Yugoslavia during 
the immigration era, I would like to briefly explore the notion of “free migrant.” For the 
generations of Vranovcians, being a free migrant is remembered in a two-fold way, similar 
to what is described by Rajkovic (2012). On the one hand, they were free to immigrate to 
Turkey and to settle where they liked; but on the other hand, this “freedom” of movement 
came without any of the governmental support or designated settlement areas that other 
Balkan immigrants benefitted from (Rajkovic, 2012). Even though the final decision to 
leave their village was up to them and the immigrants were free to choose the city where 
they would continue their lives, most of my research participants saw their ancestors’ 
immigration as inevitable. The Vranovcians’ immigration cannot be categorized as 
voluntary immigration solely because it was branded as “free migration” by the two states. 
Here, Pezo’s approach to this debate is useful. According to Pezo, the line between 
voluntary and forced migration was blurred in this human movement; as its motivational 
force also carried elements of overt and tacit state oppression, which left a huge impact 
on the collective memory of the Muslim groups from Macedonia (283). Similarly, de Haas 
argues against a dichotomy of forced versus voluntary migration. Even in the most 
vulnerable cases, immigrants have some agency to decide to migrate and in the “freest” 
choices, there are structural elements affecting migration routes and conditions (de Haas, 
2011).  
 What is remembered by the second and third generations about Turkey’s and 
Yugoslavia’s views of the immigrants contributed to their continuing identification as 
immigrants. Nearly all of the stories I was told about how they were treated by the two 
states concerned the application process. Regarding the Yugoslavian state, the most 
frequent memory is that their ancestors had to give up all of their rights and their 
citizenship, which, today, means that the second and third generation cannot claim any 
rights in Europe and cannot acquire ID’s from newly independent North Macedonia, 
although some have applied. Other than that, just one of my participants mentioned that 
the nationalization of land badly affected property owners. Most have some positive 
feelings about Tito and Yugoslavia, including memories of Muslim soldiers having pork-
free rations. Regarding Turkey, the state’s lack of support for new immigrants is very 
clearly remembered. Even though they were able to get their new IDs very quickly 
compared to other immigrants at the time, they compare themselves to other Balkan 
immigrants who arrived earlier or later than them and under different circumstances and 
underline that they received no financial support. Nor was any land was allocated to their 
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ancestors. Erken also states that the “free migrant” status created problems of resource 
scarcity and unemployment, as the immigrants were left alone in their new life in Turkey. 
One of my participants, a member of the third generation, believes that this lack of support 
resulted in a late integration of the Vranovcians. In her words: 
If they had designated areas to settle, this process [of integration] could 
have been faster and they would live more problem-free but doing 
something all alone made them work for years and years. 
Before they arrived in their new cities, the immigrants’ overall impression of Turkey was 
of a wealthy and prosperous country. However, the Turkish state’s neglect and even 
discrimination10 against them combined with the financial hardships they experienced 
during that time changed their impression of Turkey. Another third-generation described 
the contradictory policy of the government: 
Menderes was the one who opened the borders for us, he welcomed us 
well; but as we didn’t know Turkish, we were faced with such discrimination. 
“Citizen! Speak Turkish!11.” But the citizen doesn’t know Turkish. They [the 
first generation] experienced lots of troubles.  
Although I have touched upon the shared memories about the two states and their 
policies toward migrants, more explanation is needed especially concerning the 
experiences of the first generation during the initial years after immigration. In the next 
chapter, I examine that question.  
 
 
                                                
10 This part is further elaborated in the next chapter.  
11 “Citizen! Speak Turkish!” was a language assimilation program which I discuss in detail in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 3.  
We went to the Turkish land without knowing any Turkish 
We didn’t know where to go, we were lost like chicklets 
Like chicklets who lost their mother who has given birth to them12 
(Vaska Iliyeva, Pesna za Gorno Vranovci) 
In the previous chapters I reviewed the historical background of Vranovcians’ 
immigration and the remembered reasons for it by the subsequent generations. In this 
chapter, I continue with what the second and third generations remember about their 
parents’ and grandparents’ first experiences in their new country, Turkey. I start by 
analyzing the firsthand experiences of the second generations regarding exclusion and 
discrimination they faced as the children of immigrants. I continue with their adaptation to 
the new life and document the types of memories have been transmitted to the third 
generation about that time period. This chapter has two main focuses. Firstly, I explore 
what kinds of external events and structures affected the narratives of the immigrant 
community. I start by briefly reporting on what is remembered regarding the first 
generations’ experiences on the road to the new city. After that, I elaborate the 
discrimination and the individual acts of exclusion they experienced as well as memories 
of xenophobia. I also discuss the relations between immigrants and “local” people. 
Secondly, I explore the ways that the immigrants’ exclusion worked for the preservation 
and transmission of the immigrant identity. Here, I consider rapid loss of the Macedonian 
language, the hygiene ethic within the community that was especially important to the first 
generation, and marital rules and ties that affected the second generation, especially. I 
conclude this chapter by retelling this immigration story as rural to urban migration and 
analyze some of the experiences of the first and second-generation immigrants and the 
boundary markers that were born out of those experiences.  
3.1. On the Road  
To the Chashka, we were going with donkeys carrying our stuff. 3 siblings, 
I was riding the donkey. I remember we went to Chashka like this, then we 
took the train. When we passed the Greek border, everyone was clapping 
                                                
12 “Otidovme vo turska zemja turski ne znajevme da zborime, i ne znajevme kade pojdovme ka 
kupilsi iz gubeni, ka kupilsi izgubeni od svojte majki şto gi rodila” Translated from Turkish to English, 
Marina Kadriu helped with the proofreading of the translation from Macedonian. 
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on the train, because we escaped, they couldn’t catch us. With such a 
surprise, I saw everyone was hugging each other. When we arrived at 
Selami, in the station, I saw the fruit ‘orange’ for the first time in my life. My 
deceased father bought a basket of those, but we didn’t know how to eat 
an orange. We were trying to bite, but it was bitter. Someone said, “you 
should peel it off.” So, we peeled it and ate it, and realized it was sweet and 
sour. This was how I met with this fruit. Then I kept the peel of it, as its 
smell was different. After that, my dad had ten liras with him. My 
grandparents arrived in Kırklareli a year before us. With that ten liras, we 
bought train tickets to Kırklareli. My deceased father worked for like seven 
months. And with the money he saved, we came to İzmir. It was very tragic 
times, very painful… Pain… My sister woke up that morning and realized 
that we were gone. She screamed, cried, and she married an Albanian guy 
right after that as she was angry with everyone. She ran away from the 
village and disappeared. (Muammer)  
The remembered and transmitted memories of the first and second generations 
regarding the road to Izmir reflects several themes; their bewilderment with the new 
country and its differences from Macedonia, their poverty, family tragedies, and the difficult 
conditions during their travel and the poor conditions of the guesthouses they stayed in. 
According to what Muammer remembers of his family’s immigration story, his family 
decided to join the immigration wave as his father was unable to pay his taxes due to an 
unfortunate year in agricultural production when Muammer was ten years old. However, 
they were not able to take advantage of the Gentleman Agreement as his adopted older 
sister’s ID was kept by her biological family who wanted money from Muammer’s family 
for the ID. His family made a very tough decision to leave her in the village and run away 
to Turkey; they ran away from both his older sister and Macedonia, immigrating outside 
the agreement. His memory of the trip to Turkey is very telling in that sense, as this story 
reflects nearly all themes reported regarding the road. The road itself was a mix of different 
and sometimes contradicting emotions for Muammer, from the grief of leaving a family 
member behind to the relief of crossing the border safely and from the happy excitement 
of trying completely foreign fruits to the anxiety of not knowing how to do it properly. Similar 
to other immigrants, it took a while for Muammer’s family to be finally settled in Izmir. As 
my father put it: 
I mean, till we reached the house where we settled, it took us years. Edirne, 
Bursa, İzmir… These three cities, finally İzmir of course, Karşıyaka13… I 
don’t know how many years it took us to finally settle down in Karşıyaka. I 
                                                
13 The district where immigrants have the traditional neighborhoods.  
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guess it might be two or three years. Which means, they (his parents) were 
guests in every place they went. They also stayed as guests in Istanbul. 
For the immigrants who came to Turkey under the conditions of the Gentlemen 
Agreement, they had to stay for a period of time in the cities from where they received 
their invitation letter, and only later were they free to settle in whichever city in Turkey they 
desired. Because of that, most of the immigrants spent time in different cities until they 
reached Izmir. During those stays, some of them stayed in “guesthouses,” known as 
muhacirhane, and they remembered that the conditions of those places as very poor. Most 
of the participants described the muhacirhane as an overcrowded place with poor hygienic 
conditions, and two participants stated that their relatives got sick because of the poor 
hygiene in these places. I touch upon the effects of guesthouses later in the chapter when 
I discuss boundary markers. 
3.2. Finally, in Izmir: The First Years in a Foreign City 
 Most of the Muslim population of the Gorno Vranovci ended up in various 
neighborhoods of Izmir, especially Nergiz, Demirköprü, Çiğli, and Çamdibi. When I explore 
the narratives of the second and third generations, I note several reasons for that reunion 
of the village in the new geography. Firstly, earlier visits to İzmir by villagers whether as 
seasonal or long term workers meant that some of the villagers were familiar with the city. 
Secondly, due to the requirements of the agreement, the immigrants were expected to 
stay where their invitation letter was from. Hence, some of them needed to stay in Izmir 
as their invitation letters were from the earlier immigrants. The first two reasons created a 
chain migration towards Izmir, as I explained in Chapter 2. The seasonal workers returned 
to the village and shared their experiences in Izmir with the other villagers. Furthermore, 
as the first waves of Macedonian emigrants settled in Izmir and established their new life 
there, they sent letters to their family and friends in the village regarding the city, which 
contained important information on starting a new life and made it easier for the next 
waves to arrive in this city. Işıl, a third-generation immigrant, sees the reason behind the 
choice to settle in İzmir as “herd mentality”: 
I think it’s herd mentality. Because the first families who immigrated had 
settled in İzmir, some of our relatives also settled in İzmir, eventually, we 
also settled here. That’s also what they (first-gen) were saying when these 
topics were brought up. They first arrived in İstanbul, then came to İzmir. 
Some relatives settled in İstanbul, so my family also thought about staying 
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there as well. But as most of them were already in İzmir, they also came to 
İzmir.  
According to my participants, their parents or grandparents saw İzmir as a fortuitous place 
with job opportunities, a mild climate suitable for agriculture, proximity to the seaside and 
port, all of which made İzmir appear to be an accepting place for newcomers. Even though 
the İzmir in the minds of the first generation was peaceful and welcoming, some of their 
experiences did not live up to their expectations.   
 As the members of the first generations settled in İzmir, they had to start their new 
lives from scratch. They built their houses by pooling their labour through a practice 
referred to as “imece.” Imece is an institution in which participants act in solidarity to 
accomplish some tasks with the expectation that the labour will be reciprocated. This 
tradition is not unique to the immigrant population. It exists all around Anatolia’s rural areas 
and in the Balkans (Demir, 2016). The immigrants utilized imece to build their houses. 
Most of the participants shared the stories of other immigrants helping their parents with 
the construction work without expecting any money or perhaps a small sum to be paid in 
the future. Kadri, a second-generation immigrant who was 5 or 6 years old when his family 
immigrated to Turkey, explained his family’s unfamiliarity with the practice of renting 
accommodation, but they managed to acquire their own homes through imece solidarity 
in his words: 
… we didn’t know about “renting” when we were in our homeland, as all of 
us had a home there. Even if it was a shed, everyone had a home to stay, 
all of us! 800 families, all of the 800 families had a place to stay. We were 
talking about how many people were there a couple of days ago, probably 
8000… Everyone had a house. 4 people lived in one house or 5 lived in 
another one, some lived together with brides and all, but everyone had a 
home. When we arrived here… What is the rent? With your father’s family, 
your grandpa, and also Uncle Suleyman, we rented rooms from Bulgarian 
immigrants next to your grandpa’s house14. It wasn’t like home. It was like 
rooms next to each other. We started our lives there. My mom worked at a 
shop, a tobacco shop. I also worked. Everyone had to work, and with imece 
cooperation… We aimed to have a house, where we could live, a roof over 
our heads… For example, my dad was a construction worker, and if you 
were building your house, you would say “Yusuf, we need to build two walls 
today.” He would come to help you, without expecting money or salary from 
you. Maybe just lunch, as you are the owner of the house, you would give 
them lunch as a courtesy. That’s all. And you might be a plasterer, maybe 
                                                
14 Kadri’s mother and my grandfather are siblings.  
29 
some other day you would help me. This is imece cooperation. If we did 
something, that’s how we did it. 
Kadri’s explanation also gives clues to the types of occupations that were common among 
first-generation immigrants. The ones with artisanal backgrounds, if they were lucky to 
also have capital to start up their business, were able to do so. Işıl’s electrician 
grandfather, for example, was able to bring money from Macedonia. In contrast, Tayfun’s 
tailor grandfather worked in Germany for a couple of years to save money, and my 
grandfather also became a migrant worker in Germany until he was able to save enough 
to open up a small caramel candy shop in Turkey.  Others who were not lucky enough to 
start their own businesses pursued occupations that demanded very low communication 
skills, as the new immigrants did not know any Turkish. Cevizci (2007) states that the 
labour market participation rate for women was high among first-generation immigrant 
women, and my interview data also supports this as all of my interviewees' first-generation 
female relatives had worked for wages. The most common occupation among the women 
was being a laborer in tobacco factories. Others worked as cleaning personnel in factories, 
as housemaids, or as seamstresses. The most common occupations among first-
generation men were construction-related and factory work, with some of those factories’ 
names still remembered by the younger generations.  Some of those who were not able 
to find adequate employment turned to the guest-workers program in Germany to create 
financial stability for their families. It was very common for young men to leave their 
families behind in Turkey to work abroad and send remittances to them in Turkey. My 
father’s memory of his father visiting them from Germany gives insights on how the 
financial struggles affected family relations in the new city: 
My dad was in Germany. Well, there wasn’t any paternal love. He was 
always in Germany, he had only visited us in 2 years or 3 or 4 years. Even 
more, one day my mum was washing the clothes, she was washing the 
clothes in “koyito15”… Anyhow, I was looking at the street of the Mehtap 
Movie Theater, my dad was coming with a fedora hat, and luggage. I didn’t 
run towards him, I ran inside the house, saying “Oh God! Dad is coming!”  
(laughing) At home, I told mum that dad was coming, she said “Don’t lie!” I 
said, “Wallahi16, he is coming!” Just before I said so, dad entered the home 
from the door, with his fedora hat. After that, we kissed his hand. Then he 
                                                
15 My father explains this word as Macedonian for the laundry sink where you handwash clothing, 
but I could not find any similar sounding words through translation.  
16 “Swear to God”: Common exclamation among Muslims.  
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kissed us.… Wallahi, I guess I was 12 or 13. Maybe I hadn’t seen him for 
4 or 5 years. 
The feeling of the lack of paternal love was not the only negative outcome of migration in 
the new city. Most of the first and second-generation immigrants were faced with 
xenophobia, discrimination, exclusion, and even violent racist attacks in their first decades 
in İzmir. Members of the second and third generation reported hearing or hearing about 
two slurs: gavur and karafatma. Both of the slurs are attacks that challenge religious 
practices and attachments of the immigrants. Interestingly, the first raises doubts that they 
are genuine Muslims, the other labels the group as religious fundamentalists. However, 
their usage as slurs includes more than just the groups’ lack of or excess piety, these slurs 
served to other the immigrants about their language and clothing.  
 Gavur is a derogatory word meaning infidels of Islam, generally used to refer to 
Christians. Even though the slur’s usage is rare nowadays, it was used against the 
immigrants upon their arrival. The slur gavur was used to question their Islamic faith. 
Because they were believed to have converted to Islam with the conquest of the Balkans 
by the Ottoman Empire, their religious beliefs were imagined to be insincere. Furthermore, 
the group’s belief was shaped by a heterodox approach in Islam called Malamatiyya17, 
especially among the first generation who practiced a form of Sufism that was popular in 
the Balkans. Their religiosity was not always in parallel with the dominant Sunni Islam 
practiced in Turkey, making them suspect. Nonetheless, the slur was not merely a 
comment on the religiosity of the immigrants; it also labeled the group being “not Turkish.” 
Most of the times that my participants brought up the slur gavur in the interviews, they 
interpreted that the locals were calling the first generations infidels because they did not 
speak Turkish. I take up the relation between Turkishness and Islam in the next chapter; 
however, it should be noted here that this slur worked as a tool of othering not just from 
the religious perspective, but also from the nationality perspective. The group’s exclusion 
from both Turkishness and Muslimness affected their relations with local people, all of the 
second-generation interviewees and all of third-generation participants except one stated 
that local Turks were hostile towards their elders. This hostility was visible in physical 
attacks, name-calling, and in local people’s avoidance of marriage with immigrants. This 
                                                
17 Malamatiyya is a branch of Sufism that was born in the city that was the center of Sufi movement 
between 9th and 12th century, Neyshabur, Khorasan, Iran (Nouraei and Zeinali, 2020) and 
introduced to Balkans by Sufi elders who travelled the lands to carry Islamic faith to Balkans in 16th 
century (Norris, 1993). I examine the immigrants’ religious affiliation and its effect on them in the 
fourth chapter. 
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marital avoidance continued until the third generation. My parents’ elopement marriage, 
even though my mother’s family had also immigrated from the Balkans, but from Skopje 
during the same time period reflects how strongly the exclusion was even within the 
second generation.18   
 Karafatma is also a pejorative word that was used against first-generation women 
who wore black chadors in the first years after they arrived in Turkey. While the literal 
translation is “Black Fatma,” the word also means cockroach in Turkish. This slur carries 
the opposite message of gavur, as karafatma associates women’s dress with religious 
extremism. While noting that contradicting derogatory phrases are often applied to 
oppressed groups, the underlying reason behind the contradictory implications of the slurs 
used against first-generation immigrants can only be understood if one takes a look at a 
secondary implication of karafatma. The secondary implication of this slur was a reminder 
to the immigrants that they were not modern, that they did not know how to dress and act 
in a modern city and they were backward. A defensiveness is visible especially in the 
second generations when they describe why their mothers wore the chador. Instead of 
explaining it as religious dress, they tended to explain the choice of this dress with the 
requirements of working in the tobacco factories. This conversation between members of 
the second generation explains the first-generation women’s experiences of discrimination 
and how the second generation perceived this discrimination against their parents: 
Kadri:  ... While my mom was coming back to home from work…. 
Sevdiye: ‘Karafatmas are coming!’   
Kadri:  They used to wear the black chador, it was cheap, and they 
worked in  tobacco shops, that’s the most suitable thing to 
wear, as it’s a dirty job. When they arrived at the station, local 
people used to call them karafatmas.  
Bedriye: Our moms suffered a lot. 
Kadri, himself, sees a need to explain why the first-generation women wore what 
otherwise was seen as religious clothing. His efforts to justify the dress might be born out 
of the discrimination they faced for continuing to dress as they had in the village.  On the 
other hand, it is possible that Kadri was correct in asserting that their mothers wore the 
chador because it was suitable for their jobs. Even so, the need to provide a practical 
                                                
18 Even though my mother’s family also immigrated with the conditions of Gentlemen’s Agreement 
in the 50s, they were not faced with similar exclusion and discrimination as they are Yörüks 
(nomadic Turks), who spoke Turkish fluently and were recognized as members of the Turkic ethnic 
family (Inalcik, 2014).  
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explanation suggests that the second generation internalized this slur and felt the need to 
show that they were not the backward religious fanatics that the slur implies.   
 Much of the discrimination members of the first and second generation faced was 
related to their usage of Macedonian. As I discuss language as a boundary marker below, 
I touch here only on some of the effects of language-related discrimination. When I asked 
the question directly, most of the participants asserted that they do not see themselves as 
immigrants, explaining the reason as their inability to speak Macedonian. Burcu, the eldest 
daughter of Muammer says: 
Well, do I see myself as an immigrant? People say that about me. But I 
don’t feel like an immigrant that much, in reality. I was born here, raised 
here, and I was raised in an environment where the language [Macedonian] 
was not spoken. 
Before I interviewed Burcu, one of the main questions I had was about the loss of the 
Macedonian language in two generations. The first and second-generation immigrants 
had a relatively closed community and marriage with local people was stigmatized by both 
locals and immigrants, which led to families in which both parents spoke Macedonian as 
their mother tongue. Nonetheless, most of the children of these families were only able to 
speak the language in a very basic way. Burcu’s story is a blueprint of how and why 
second-generation Vranovcians decided not to teach Macedonian to their children. Burcu 
states that her mother was a baby when their family immigrated to Turkey; however, her 
grandmother did not speak any Turkish, so her mother began to encounter Turkish 
regularly only when she started school. Burcu underlined that her mother’s teachers 
repeatedly warned immigrant students to speak Turkish among themselves, and imposed 
corporeal punishment if they spoke Macedonian. Burcu’s father, Muammer, also had 
deeply unpleasant experiences regarding language. She explains how her father sold 
simits19 on the street when he was ten years old. Knowing some basic Turkish helped him 
sell the bagels, but he had lots of stressful moments due to the language barrier. 
Muammer also states that he “felt like an alien” in school, at first. Even though he had 
been a successful student in third grade in Macedonia, in Turkey, he was moved back to 
second grade because he did not know the Latin alphabet. He noted that the bullying he 
experienced in school, was not just from his peers but also from teachers, due to his 
accent, which eventually gave him a phobia of reading aloud. In his words: 
                                                
19 Simit is a bread product similar to a bagel.  
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… when I was in the sixth grade, my teacher asked me to read a literature 
piece out loud. It was a short one ... When I was reading that piece, I made 
a mistake. Then, my teacher made fun of me. Because of that, I still 
struggle to read pieces out loud, I cannot give a speech from a document. 
All my life I have been giving speeches in formal places, but if you ask me 
to read something, I will probably stutter. That teacher’s behaviour left a 
fault in me. I am actually a very good speaker. But I cannot read, I never 
give speeches from a document because that teacher left a scar on me. 
Whenever I read from a piece, I remember that moment when my teacher 
made fun of me, and I find myself in a deadlock. 
Both Muammer’s and his wife’s experiences may have led them to prohibit speaking 
Macedonian in the house so that their children would speak Turkish without any accent 
and would not encounter the discrimination that they had felt.   
 These kinds of individual acts of discrimination described by Muammer and others 
occurred alongside a revived state-led project mostly known by the infamous slogan 
“Citizen! Speak Turkish!”. Citizen! Speak Turkish originated in the late 1920s and early 
1930s as a state project to suppress to use of minority languages in daily communication. 
This discriminatory project started as a student initiative in Istanbul and immediately 
gained state support (Aslan, 2007). Methods employed by the project started with putting 
up signs reading “A good citizen speaks Turkish,” or posters with similar messages in 
cities with high numbers of non-Turkish speakers. This form of structural violence 
contributed to increasing tension between Turkish and non-Turkish speakers and caused 
a state of fear in which it was nearly impossible to speak a language other than Turkish in 
public spaces (Bali, 2006.) In Izmir, the project was heavily used in the 1930s to suppress 
the Jewish minority that used Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) instead of Turkish in their daily lives 
(Aslan, 2007). Hence, the city’s Turkish population was already experienced with this 
discriminatory campaign and it was easily revived when it was again needed to force a 
new linguistic minority to adopt Turkish. Four of my participants mentioned this campaign 
when I asked if either their parents or grandparents experienced any discrimination when 
they first settled in Izmir. Although those four individuals are members of the same 
extended family, this strongly suggests that the elder generations shared their memories 
of seeing signs and posters with discriminatory messages with their children and 
grandchildren. The campaign’s name was not directly remembered in some cases; 
however, the effects of the campaign are still remembered. In Özen’s, a member of third-
generation, words: 
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… as they (the first generation) didn’t know Turkish, they started work in 
cotton fields, they were going to fields to work. My mom always says this, 
that they saw signs on the road, “Speak Turkish!” “This is İzmir, Turkey, 
speak Turkish!” These signs were all for us, as we immigrated, they said 
that there were times that we were excluded a lot during that time when we 
first came.   
This campaign shows that the individual discriminatory behaviours of the local people, 
especially based on language, were also supported by the state and its Turkification 
efforts.  
 I should note that the language-based discrimination Vranovcians experienced 
was not unique. Kurdish people, especially, have long experienced similar discriminatory 
behaviour for using their language in public places. For example, Gellman shares two 
memories of their interviewees. One of them states how ordinary people might get angry 
if you speak Kurdish on the phone on the street and the other interviewee shares how 
their mother has a reluctance to talk to them on the phone while they are not in a private 
place as she only knows Kurdish (Gellman, 2016).  
 The final form of discrimination my participants described is physical assaults that 
occurred in the immigrant neighborhoods. I grew up hearing stories of fights that had 
occurred in immigrant neighborhoods; however, reasons for those fights were never 
spoken of openly. The main theme of the stories was the bravery of the immigrant youth. 
When I interviewed another member of the third generation, my cousin Tayfun, I had the 
chance to ask that what he understood to be the underlying reasons for those fights. 
Tayfun was raised in a historic immigrant neighbourhood, and his father was celebrated 
as one of the brave immigrant youths. According to Tayfun, most of the fights began with 
verbal attacks. Both Tayfun and my father, who was present while I interviewed Tayfun, 
described the attacks as racist. It is also important to note that most of the physical fights 
were with another migrant group, rural to urban economic migrants who had come to Izmir 
from Eskişehir, Turkey. Two other second-generation interviewees also mentioned 
physical assaults when I asked them about the discrimination they experienced upon their 
arrival in İzmir.   
 The combination of the different forms of exclusion and discrimination experienced 
by members of the first and second generations produced different outcomes or 
responses among the second and third generations. Firstly, some parts of the identity, 
especially the visible ones such as the Macedonian language, were nearly completely 
erased and some portion of the second and third generations assimilated into the broader 
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Turkish society, erasing their immigrant identity. Secondly, especially among members of 
the third-generation, the memories of discrimination combined with the current political 
atmosphere seem to have created a radical acceptance of the immigrant identity and 
revival of some elements of Macedonian culture, such as wedding traditions, music, and 
cuisine. I examine the second response in more detail in chapter five.  
3.3. Boundary Markers: Cleaning, Marital Ties, and 
Language 
We immigrants all do one thing. When we wake up in the morning, the first 
thing we do is to clean in front of our houses… You don’t realize it when 
you are a part of it, but in our community, cleanliness starts from the 
outside. First, you clean the environment that you live in, then you clean 
yourself, and your inner self. In that sense, these are very beautiful things, 
and I am really happy that I am an immigrant. 
These were the words of Burcu, a third-generation woman when I asked her for 
any last remarks. The three steps of cleaning mentioned by Burcu are quite interesting. 
For the first and second-generation immigrants, the most important part of this daily ritual 
is the cleaning of the outside of their house. It is followed by the cleaning of interiors, 
personal hygiene, and spiritual cleanliness, as in having good morals. Even though Burcu 
generally did not identify as an immigrant, she positioned herself as an immigrant while 
she was explaining the philosophy and practices of cleaning. Cleaning and hygiene were 
recurring themes throughout the interviews, used especially to identify what distinguishes 
an immigrant from the local people. Most of the participants described cleaning habits as 
indicative of immigrants, and some of them even stated that local people are dirty. My 
father, speaking in hyperbole, even stated: 
… We are proud to be immigrants, always. Because local people, …, they 
didn’t even have proper toilet hygiene. They are dirty people! We taught 
them to be clean. 
The habits of cleanliness and routines of cleaning, such as cleaning outside of the 
houses, front yard, and inside of the houses were the main cleaning rituals for especially 
the first- and second-generation immigrant women. As Burcu stated, for immigrants 
“cleanliness starts from the outside.”  This means that most of the cleaning routines they 
follow are the observable ones, which may include painting the outdoor walls with calcite 
paint to make it white and prevent insects from entering. For these immigrants, cleaning 
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routines became a way of expressing themselves; to demonstrate that they were better 
(cleaner) than locals, and these habits worked to reinforce their distinction. Even though 
most of them also stressed the importance of personal hygiene, the main focus was 
always on keeping the house and also the neighbourhood clean. Some of them compared 
their neighborhood with other neighbourhoods. One stated: 
It would be obvious for anyone that it is an immigrant neighbourhood that 
they have entered. No one could say even a single bad word about the 
streets. 
The discourse on cleanliness was a bit of a surprise to me and forced me to 
consider how to interpret a claim to cleanliness as a marker of immigrant culture and 
identity. Especially interesting is the fact that it is a quality of immigrantness that members 
of the third generation raised in our interviews.   
 Before examining how the cleaning discourse became a boundary marker, I would 
like to underline that this habit of first and second-generation women was likely something 
they brought from their village in Macedonia, but has taken on new meaning in Izmir. 
According to Hirschon and Gold’s ethnographic work on Yerania, Greece examining 
territoriality and home; exterior parts of homes are as important as the interior. They also 
underlined that exterior parts are indications of the household’s character (1982). An 
orderly exterior is evidence of good moral character. The importance given to the 
cleanliness of outdoor parts of houses is widespread in the Balkans. It is likely that the 
first-generation immigrants consciously or unconsciously used their views about 
cleanliness and their cleaning practices as a boundary marker that distinguished them 
from local people. At the same time, it is also likely that cleaning served as an assertion 
that they were good Muslims. The latter could be related to the discrimination they faced; 
as a response to local people questioning their faith by addressing them as gavurs and 
demeaning them by calling them “cockroaches,” a creature associated with filth. Like other 
Abrahamic religions, Islam gives utmost importance to hygiene and cleanliness, which is 
observable, especially, in the ritual of Al-Wudu.20 First-generation immigrants might have 
enhanced their hygiene rituals as a way of proving that their faith was reliable, that they 
were Muslims just like the local people.  In this case, cleaning rituals might have worked 
as a signifier of being good Muslims.  
                                                
20 Wudu is the Islamic ablution ritual of cleaning body parts before the daily prayers. It includes 
washing hands, arms, face, neck and feet. It is required to be repeated before the prayers anytime 
a bodily fluid is discharged.  
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A second possible interpretation for the discourse of cleanliness could be a 
response to the difficult conditions experienced by first-generation immigrants. According 
to my interviewers, the conditions on the road to Turkey were very dirty, and stories about 
those poor conditions continue to be shared, even to the third generation. Işıl explained 
how her grandmother caught an infection on the road, as they could not find a proper toilet 
and the hygiene was very poor. Sevdiye, a member of the second generation told a similar 
story. Describing the conditions in the guesthouses, she said: 
It was like you stay in the same room with ten other people, all of the kids 
and everyone. Everyone eats from the same dish, just like what we watch 
in movies, like life in villages. That’s how they told us. 
Order and cleanliness of their houses were related to their reputation and morals 
for Vranovcians. As they couldn’t control these in the guesthouses, the first-generation 
might had developed anxiety over cleaning, perhaps even enhancing their habits as a 
response to the hard conditions they suffered during their first years in Turkey.  
 Still another possible interpretation of the focus on cleanliness could be that the 
Macedonian immigrants wanted to emphasize their distinction from the rural Turkish 
migrants who were also recent arrivals to İzmir. In contrast to the ancestors of my 
participants, Turkish rural to urban migrants had the benefit of economic support from their 
villages. They received durable foods from relatives still living in rural eras, and they 
received remittances from the land held by their families, helping them transition to the 
urban and capitalist life. These supports gave them more flexibility in employment in the 
new urban environment than the immigrants from Vranovci who could not receive support 
from distant kin. The Vranovcians were forced to take jobs that were considered dirty or 
menial, such as working in the tobacco factory. It is possible that cleaning allowed them 
to project an image of cleanliness and “rural purity” amid the “urban trash” that surrounded 
them (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000). As anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966) observed, 
dirt is a matter of place. Urban life may have felt very much disordered for immigrants from 
Gorno Vranovci, which was a much less chaotic place, a place that was mundane and 
predictable. More importantly, the Vranovcians were made to feel they were out of place 
in Izmir. As I discussed above, members of the first and second generation were regularly 
told that they were uncivilized. Even though immigrants saw themselves as “Europeans in 
a non-European country,” as rural migrants themselves, they may have struggled with 
adapting to the daily habits and ways of living in an urban environment. Displays of 
cleanliness allowed them to present themselves as orderly and emplaced.  
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Any and all of these assumptions might have been played some role in 
transforming visibly cleanliness into a signifier of an immigrant identity for Vranovcians. 
Many members of the third generation live outside the ethnic neighborhoods they grew up 
in, and they live in apartments that offer more anonymity and less outdoor space to show-
off purity and cleanliness. Nonetheless, they continue to associate cleanliness as a 
positive attribute of their community. Hence, cleanliness, even as a concept rather than 
the actual practice, has remained as a boundary marker distinguishing immigrants from 
local people.   
 Marital rules and practices also served as a boundary marker between the 
Vranovcians and Turkish nationals. According to Bonjour and de Hart, religious and 
cultural norms shaping marital boundaries are crucial for understanding who belongs to a 
group and who does not (Bonjour and de Hart, 2013).  In that sense, understanding the 
marital restrictions experienced by the immigrants would be helpful in understanding the 
othering experienced and later reinforced by the first and second generations. 
Vranovcians were following a specific endogamy rule, one which looks for multiple 
generational separation between partners (Dikici, 2014). When they first settled in Izmir, 
it could have been a probability that they end up marrying local people due to the strict 
rules forbidding marrying relatives. However, marrying local people was stigmatized 
among the first and second generations. Naci, a second-generation immigrant who is 
married to another Balkan immigrant, explains the marital restrictions like this; 
In old times, immigrant people were only able to marry other immigrants. 
This was a very strict rule. It wasn’t acceptable to marry a local girl if you 
were a boy from Fikri Altay, or Çamdibi, very strict rules I mean. And also, 
the daughters of your neighbour… You cannot marry the daughters of your 
neighbour; you cannot even be girlfriends with them. Also, you cannot 
marry relatives until the seventh generation, which means you cannot 
marry the daughter of your uncle, or aunt. We learned about 
consanguineous marriage here. At least the seventh-generation difference 
is looked for, to avoid marriage within the family. And the daughter of your 
neighbour is seen as your sister, that’s why you can’t marry. It was not 
acceptable! No way! When they needed some help, we would be there for 
them. When they came from work, we would accompany them, they are 
our sisters, our neighbours… 
Despite these rules, two of my second-generation interviewees were married to 
other Vranovicans, and the other two were married to other Balkan immigrants, but all of 
them struggled with the stigma of exclusion from Turkishness. Even in the third generation, 
this stigma’s remains are somehow visible; only one of them is married to a local person 
39 
and two of them are in relationships with other Balkan immigrants. There might be several 
reasons behind these marital restrictions.  
 First of all, according to Islamic sharia law, it is forbidden for a Muslim woman to 
marry a non-Muslim man (Serbestoğlu, 2012). Even though Turkey had been a secular 
country since the foundation of the republic, Islamic rules, and ways of living carried its 
impact on secular law and everyday practices. As the immigrants were labeled as gavurs 
and their faith was not trusted by the local people, locals might have avoided marrying 
immigrants due to suspicions about their religious beliefs. The abstinence of marriage with 
local Turks could be seen as an extension of the discrimination they were faced with in 
the new environment. As they were not seen as a part of the broader Turkish society when 
they were first settled in İzmir, they were not seen as eligible brides and grooms for the 
locals. 
 Another reason might be immigrants’ own reluctance to marry outsiders as they 
might have seen local people as a threat due to the discrimination they had faced. First 
and second generations might have developed marital restrictions themselves to avoid 
losing the sense of community between immigrants. As nearly the whole village of 
Vranovci immigrated to several nearby neighbourhoods in Izmir, they may have wanted 
to keep the community intact even though this might mean having few potential marriage 
partners, especially when it is combined with the strict marital rules.   
 The marital restrictions for immigrants gradually declined. The first marriages 
between Vranovcians and outsiders occurred among the second generation, but they 
were seen as anomalies and the couples faced resistance from both families. Burcu 
explains the marriage restrictions and her local aunt-in-law’s experiences in the immigrant 
family: 
… They never married someone outside of the community. Never gave any 
brides or took brides, for a period of time. My uncle is one of the first people 
who studied at a university, so he met his wife there. He fell in love with her 
and all of the village21 was shaking with this. How could this happen? … 
Everyone was against this as they would take a bride from a “yerli”. They 
didn’t want this to happen. They didn’t accept my aunt-in-law in the family. 
So, in that sense, my aunt-in-law is revolutionary. A “yerli” bride, but she 
tolerated them so gracefully, the deceased woman, when she died a couple 
of years ago, everyone said how she tolerated all of us so good and 
                                                
21 It should be noted that she refers to her relatives and other immigrant families as “the village”, 
even though they had not been living in a rural environment for decades when this marriage 
occurred. This might be a sign that she sees first and older second generations as the extension 
of the village Vranovci in Turkey, somehow preserving a rural identity.  
40 
accepted us so good, and she never showed her difference. Maybe, they 
felt lowly because of this immigration for quite a long time and when it’s told 
to their face they felt uncomfortable, that’s why they didn’t want anyone into 
their community for a while.  That’s my opinion on that now, with my 
mindset at the age of 49. Before that, I was very angry with them for those 
behaviours. For example, my aunt-in-law’s pet peeve was talking in 
immigrant language22 next to her. But they still used the language next to 
her. 
The use of the Macedonian language, while local Turkish brides or grooms were 
present, might be a sign that especially the first generation did not fully embrace those in-
laws as a part of their family, as they were not a part of the greater immigrant community. 
As the language was lost dramatically in the second and third generations, this way of 
othering also diminished. Another interesting point on the gradual decline of the marital 
restrictions is the preference for selecting other Balkan immigrants over local people as 
marriage partners. As it is visible in my interviewees' preferences, marrying or dating 
people who are of immigrant descent from other regions of Balkans such as Bulgaria or 
Thessaloniki is common among second and third generations. Furthermore, this 
behaviour could be seen as a tendency of Balkan regionalism within the immigrant 
population, as most of them still carry positive attributions, which I examine in the fifth 
chapter under immigrants’ perception of Balkans. However, nowadays there is no visible 
stigma from marrying complete outsiders among the member of the third generation.  
The last boundary marker I discuss is the use of the Macedonian language by 
members of the first and second generation and its impact on the third generation. The 
pattern of language assimilation of Vranovcians is very similar to the three-generation 
Anglicization model explored by scholars like Veltman and Fishman (cited in Alba et al, 
2002). The model explains how different immigrant groups in the US lost their ancestral 
languages and assimilated to English within three generations. It suggests that the first 
generation of immigrants learned English, but continued using their mother tongue in 
intimate circles, including family and friends, while the second generation used English 
primarily even within family leading to the loss of mother tongue by the third generation. 
For Vranovcians, even though the mother tongue has been nearly lost and most of the 
                                                
22 Most of the Vranovcians use the phrase “immigrant language” (Göçmence) interchangeably with 
Macedonian. Göçmence is Macedonian with Turkish influences used by first and second 
generation immigrants. It is a language born out of transition from Macedonian to Turkish. In 
Kemal’s words (second gen): “Göçmence my grandma spoke was 70% similar to Russian. The 
language changed and changed, putting new Turkish words in it… Now we speak Göçmence but, 
25% of it is Turkish. But what my grandma spoke was… now when I meet Russian people and talk, 
I can understand some of the words they used as my grandma also used them.” 
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third generations who know Macedonian are not fluent, Macedonian, or as most of the 
immigrants prefer to call “the Immigrant Language” has stayed as a boundary marker 
differentiating who is an immigrant and who is not. Third-generation interviewees who do 
not identify themselves as immigrants first explained their lack of language ability as one 
of the main reasons they do not consider themselves to be immigrants.  For them, the 
inability to speak Macedonian was as important as the absence of personal experience 
with immigration. Tayfun’s explanation is striking: 
When I was in secondary school, I was sometimes using some Macedonian 
while speaking without realizing it, so my teachers would ask “Are you an 
immigrant?” But, as I haven’t used the language for a long period of time, I 
lost the capability of using it properly now. I hated that Grandma was not 
able to speak Turkish properly, now I became the same. I don’t like 
speaking with an accent, I find it funny. And I became that person who 
speaks like that. I turned into a ‘kıro’23 from an immigrant. 
A similar approach to see a direct relationship between knowledge of language and 
identity is visible in Kurdish groups as well. Gellman notes that Kurds who experienced 
language loss also experienced a loss in their attachment to their culture (2016: 107). It 
should also be noted that the other third-generation interviewees who do identify as 
immigrants also do not know Macedonian, but have a better grasp of the language than 
Tayfun. Işıl, for example, lived with her grandparents throughout her childhood, and they 
mainly used Macedonian for communication within the family. Özen’s parents were 
comparably older than the rest of the second generation, making them more prone to use 
the Macedonian in their daily interactions. However, Burcu’s parents who were in the same 
age group as Özen’s had a completely different experience when it comes to language. 
As I noted above, they both had memories of being stigmatized for their lack of fluency in 
Turkish, and consequently, prohibited the use of Macedonian in the house. Here, the 
occupational position may be a good indicator of why the language was completely 
prohibited in the family. Muammer, who worked as a state official was discriminated 
against because of the way he spoke Turkish. Özen’s father, Kadri, on the other hand, 
was a dental technician with his own office in the immigrant neighbourhood. Having a 
Macedonian accent was not a problem for him.   
 In the cases of Işıl and Özen, one might expect that they would have full command 
over Macedonian, as each of their parents have Vranovcian roots, and they both had the 
                                                
23 Lowbrow, ignorant person. Comes from Kurdish “Kro” meaning donkey-foal. 
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opportunity to learn the language from the first generation. However, both of them have 
Turkish as their mother tongue and do not speak Macedonian at an advanced level. When 
I asked what Özen thought about the loss of language, she noted her parents’ and even 
her grandparents’ reluctance to speak Macedonian with her:  
When my grandma was alive -- she died last year, and she was 90 
something years old -- she was trying to talk Turkish with me. Maybe she 
wanted to learn, too. Or maybe as she thought I didn’t understand, she was 
trying to talk. But she talked in Macedonian, too. I understood what she 
said, but I answered in Turkish. The people who lived together with them, 
like my cousins and all, as they spend more time with Grandpa and 
Grandma, they know Macedonian better. But, one older generation than 
us, our parents, don’t speak Macedonian with us. 
Even Kadri, who had his own office in the immigrant neighborhood used Turkish as the 
main medium of communication within the family, reflecting a similar pattern as the three-
generation model of Anglicization. There could be several reasons for the reluctance to 
use Macedonian by the second generation. First of all, second-generation immigrants tend 
to identify with Turkishness (Cevizci, 2007), and therefore they tend to use the language 
more frequently. Speaking Turkish fluently is seen one of the signifiers of being Turkish, 
which can be visible in this quotation of Atatürk: “One of the most obvious, precious 
qualities of a nation is the language. A person who says he belongs to the Turkish nation 
should first and under all circumstances speak Turkish. It is not possible to believe a 
person’s claims that he belongs to the Turkish nation, to the Turkish culture, if he does not 
speak Turkish.” (cited in Bali, 2006).  
 Secondly, they witnessed the discrimination their parents faced. They also faced 
discrimination for using Macedonian or speaking Turkish with an accent. Lastly, they likely 
experienced few benefits from Macedonian-Turkish bilingualism – they did not foresee a 
reason or opportunity to return to Macedonia – but they did experience benefits from 
speaking Turkish without an accent. Therefore, the language assimilation process was 
fast among the immigrants.  
 On the other hand, even though the language was lost, the heritage and memory 
of it remain among those who identify as immigrants. Remains of the Macedonian 
language in the third generation have become mementos of the immigration of their 
grandparents. These remnants include Macedonian songs played at weddings and at 
circumcision ceremonies, ways of addressing friends, occasional words used in daily 
interaction, and tragicomic stories of their grandparents’ or parents’ misunderstandings 
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resulting from a lack of Turkish skills or confusion between Turkish and Macedonian. 
Before concluding this section, I want to emphasize that even among the interviewees 
within the third generation who did not identify themselves as immigrants, language was 
seen as a core element of being an immigrant. After our interview, Burcu mentioned that 
as she got older, she wanted to learn Macedonian as she wants to “engage with her roots 
more.”  
 As I recounted in this chapter, the Vranovcians left a village with very limited 
resources, both in infrastructural terms such as healthcare and educational opportunities, 
but also limited in the natural bounty. These characteristics of the village are still known 
by even the third generation. On the other hand, the city they settled in Turkey, Izmir, is a 
large urban settlement with comparably better infrastructural resources and gifted with 
natural beauty and fertile soil. Therefore, the first generation’s cultural shock was not 
solely due to immigrating to Turkey without knowing the language, but also immigrating to 
a new atmosphere which required leaving their old ways of living behind and adopting to 
completely new practices and lifestyles, such as transformation from being a villager to a 
laborer, working for wages. As I explained above, during this process, Vranovcians lacked 
a support system in terms of both financial and spiritual support. The effects of 
discrimination they were faced with in Izmir were thus, doubly felt and contributed to their 
decisions to erect symbolic boundaries around their enclave.  
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Chapter 4.  
 In the previous two chapters, I examined how members of the second and third 
generations described theirs and their parents’ exclusion from Turkishness. In this 
chapter, I look at some of the ways that the Vranovcians and their descendants enacted 
a Turkish identity and the difficulties members of the third generation have encountered. I 
consider how members of the third generation’s understanding of the past affects their 
view of the present and how the contemporary political atmosphere impinges on their 
sense of belonging.  
 One of the labels that was once applied to Vranovcians is Torbesh, yet this is an 
identity that has not been taken up by members of the third generation. In fact, only one 
of the third-generation participants mentioned being Torbesh, while one of the second-
generation participants associated the term with Turkishness through myths. In this 
chapter, I briefly examine the loss of the Torbesh identity. After that, I will explore the 
connection between Turkish and Muslim identities, and consider how Islam acted as a 
bridge to Turkish identity and facilitated the immigrants’ assimilation. Later, I examine the 
differences within the third-generation members of my participants in relation to their 
identification with Turkishness. The older participants in my study have similar tendencies 
with the second generation and the younger ones have different and stronger ties with 
immigrantness. Interestingly, the youngest members of the third generation readily 
identified as immigrants, while older ones did so more reluctantly. I propose that the rise 
of political Islam has resulted, following Unlu, in a Muslimness Crisis, which might explain 
the difference in identification by older and younger members of the third-generation. My 
sample, however; is small, and making generalizations with it is difficult. 
4.1. “Torbeshes”: What’s in a Name?  
 Gorno Vranovci is one of the Torbesh villages of the Chaska region of Macedonia. 
Macedonian speaking Muslims were generally known as “Torbeshes,” an identity distinct 
from the others in the region including Macedonian, Turkish or Albanian. However, it could 
be said that the distinctness of the identity had never really flourished or was never really 
clear, and among the descendants of immigrants, it is almost forgotten. Albania, 
Macedonia, and Turkey all have their own discourses on this group, making it difficult to 
definitively specify a distinct Torbesh culture and identity. Individuals living in North 
45 
Macedonia are considered Macedonian Muslims, and because they speak Macedonian, 
they are not recognized as a minority. According to Gjorgiev, some Torbeshes were 
assimilated into the Albanian minority, especially after the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
(Gjorgiev, 2009). Most of the Torbeshes living in Macedonia see themselves as Turkish 
through their religious ties, a nationalistic position supported by some Turkish academics 
(for example, Gökdağ 2013).  The label Torbesh also carries a pejorative connotation.  
 According to Dikici, the name “Torbesh” indicates the group’s conversion to Islam 
just to gain one bag of cheese. This almost certainly apocryphal story and the groups’ 
loyalty to the Ottomans together created the mindset which made the word Torbesh 
pejorative, and according to the author, at least half of the group does not accept the word 
Torbesh to define themselves. This may be one reason for why the immigrants forgot, or 
even if they remember, intentionally act like they do not know about Torbeshness. First of 
all, in order to understand this loss of identity, examining the myths and stories related to 
the etymology of the word Torbesh would be crucial. There are various stories explaining 
why the group is called Torbesh24, but the main one involves their late conversion to Islam 
and how the group’s Christian neighbors nicknamed them after “torba”, which means bag 
in Turkish. As the word Torbesh reminds them of the allegation that their ancestors 
converted to Islam not because they were believers, but to get a bag of cheese (Dikici, 
2008; Gjorgiev, 2009) it may make their Muslim identity questionable and their faith 
unreliable. If true, it legitimates their exclusion and discrimination in Turkey and gives 
credence to the slur of gavur.   
 The first time I heard the word “Torbesh”, I was with my mother who was visiting 
friends. The word was used by one of the local (non-immigrant) women in the group in the 
context of the infamous cheese myth. The tension in the atmosphere was so thick that 
one could cut it with a knife. Through that event, I learned that my parents had eloped 
                                                
24 Another claim Dikici investigates is related with Bogomils and the author states that Bogomil 
missionaries were also known by carrying bags of books related to their faith, and Torbeshes are 
the descendants of the Bogomils who later converted to Islam. Macnamara notes that this claim is 
related with national-ethnic identity construction needs of the group; as using “glorious” history to 
build legitimacy for an identity is very significant and popular in Balkans and especially in 
Macedonia; which is also visible with the numerous Alexander the Great monuments (Macnamara, 
2018). Also, according to Gjorgiev, there haven’t been any evidence of historical Bogomil 
settlements in place where Torbeshes are populated currently (Gjorgiev, 2009). Other stories 
related with the word “torba” are bag-carriers who are working as cattle-breeders, mobile sales 
people who sell halva and drinks, and a branch of Ottoman janissaries named Torba Oğlanları/ 
Torba Acemileri (Dikici, 2008).  
46 
because my grandfather would not allow his daughter (my mother) to marry a Torbesh, a 
descendant of a group who he thought had sold their faith for a bag of cheese.    
 I asked each of the participants in this study what comes to their mind when they 
hear the word “Torbesh”. Only one of the third-generation participants had referenced 
Torbeshes in our conversation prior to my question, and it came out while we were talking 
about religion. Although he also believes that the group was late converts to Islam, he 
avoids using the term Torbesh, but he used the term to reference other people’s opinions: 
Some people say we are the ones who were forced to convert to Islam with 
the sword25. Some say we are Torbesh, but this is a fact that we are a 
community who had converted to Islam later. Let’s say, this history goes 
back to the 1500s. So, it’s a later time that we converted to Islam. That is 
my opinion. 
Surprisingly to me, all of the other third-generation participants had a more or less similar 
point of view with each other when I asked about the Torbesh identity: Torbeshes were 
also immigrants, but different from “us”.  
How can I explain that? … Torbesh, like, it’s a different village26. Torbesh 
people… More different… 
We never called ourselves Torbesh, so I don’t know. I don’t have much 
idea on that, to be honest. I overheard about it, but I never researched that. 
I guess they are people who came from other regions. I don’t know much 
about that.  
I recall it from somewhere… Hmm… Feels like it is the name of an 
immigrant’s…. Like, I heard this word, but I couldn’t make sense of it if you 
ask me to. Maybe it’s like, Laz people… 
 As Torbeshness never gained the power to become a national or ethnic identity in 
the Balkans, and as it became synonymous with the slur “gavur” and untrustworthy for 
immigrants due to the discrimination they were facing, it had been largely forgotten by the 
third generation. When the responses of the second generation are compared to the third 
generation, it is visible that the discrimination the first and second generation were faced 
with the discourse of “gavur” might have triggered the forgetting of Torbeshness, as all of 
                                                
25 Kılıç Müslümanı: Muslims of Sword- a derogatory idiom to state a group of people who were 
forced to convert to Islam.  
26 The reason why this interviewee thought Torbesh might be a misremembering as there is a 
similar sounding region nearby to Vranovci, namely Tikveš. Hence, she might have confused the 
two.  
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the second-generation members knew about the name and its pejorative background, 
which involves “the cheese myth”.  The interesting part that should be mentioned here is 
one of the second-generation participants, Muammer, who served as a school principal 
and later regional education officer stated that the focal group was indeed Torbesh, but 
Torbeshes were actually Kuman Turks. In parallel with this mindset, one of the second-
generation participants explained their immigration as “returning to home”. I will explore 
later in the chapter how and why this myth was used to build the ethnic background to 
Turkishness and why there is a discourse of returning to the home among some of the 
second generations.  
4.2. Turkish and Muslim: The Relationship Between Two 
Identities 
One common narrative that has been clearly transferred from the first and second 
generations to the youngest immigrant concerns the slur gavur. Other than their alleged 
late conversion to Islam and the cheese myth, there was another possible reason that the 
Macedonian immigrants were called gavurs. This was because the first generation did not 
speak Turkish. Even though the term gavur indicates not being a Muslim, Turks use the 
term for a person who is perceived as not Turkish enough, in a broader context; including 
not just Torbeshes but other immigrants from the Balkans or Caucasus. In this section, I 
examine the relationship between Turkishness and Islam and how the two identities 
became fused in the minds of the general population as well as in the immigrants’ minds.  
The essential relation between Islam and Turkishness can be seen in the 
etymological history of the word “nation” in Turkish. The common word for nation is millet. 
According to the Nişanyan Etymological Dictionary (2017), one of the most comprehensive 
etymological dictionaries in Turkish, the word millet comes from the Arabic word root mll 
meaning religion, moral laws, or a religious community. I should also note here that during 
the Ottoman Empire, the population was categorized by religion, and each religious group 
was labelled as “millet” (Uğuş, 2019). Turkish people were placed under the Muslim 
“millet” and the circular relationship between these two identities is most probably rooted 
in this categorization. The Turkish version of the word nation, ulus came into popular use 
only after the 1930s, after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (Nişanyan 
Dictionary, 2017) but never became as popular as the word millet. Other evidence of the 
tie between religion and nationhood in Turkey is the population exchange that happened 
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between Turkey in Greece in the 1920s. This population exchange was based on mainly 
religious differences; resulted in Greek-speaking Muslims being resettled in Turkey and 
Turkish-speaking Orthodox to Greece27.   
 To examine the connection between Islam and Turkishness I draw on the insights 
of Baris Ünlü (2018). Inspired by Whiteness Studies, Ünlü coined the phrase “Turkishness 
Contract” to understand the ways that Kurds are regarded as less than Turkish. The goal 
of Whiteness Studies is to recognize and problematize whiteness as no more ordinary 
than any other racial identity. For Ünlü, Turkishness depends on three characteristics. 
These are first, being Muslim and preferably Sunni Muslim, second, being both passively 
and actively ignorant regarding purges of non-Muslims from Anatolia, and lastly, again, 
being both passively and actively ignorant regarding Kurds and the active suppression of 
the Kurdish language and culture (Ünlü, 2018)28. The first and most important condition of 
the contract includes being a Muslim, which creates a double-edged sword for Balkan 
immigrants. On the one side, they were able to be counted as a part of “Turkish descent 
and culture” thanks to their religious ties and their history of being part of the Ottoman 
Empire. The recognition that they were “Turks” is what made their immigration from the 
former Yugoslavia to Turkey possible in the first place (Pezo, 2018). Thus, their religion 
created a gateway to Turkishness, if they agreed to forgo their distinct ethnic backgrounds, 
including language, and dissolved into the broader society. According to Ünlü, this process 
includes both learning and forgetting: learning to be Turkish and forgetting to be what you 
once were (Ünlü, 2018: 257). Hence, the first and especially second generation was in 
this process of learning and forgetting, a process I prefer to call Turkification.   
 Turkification is the systematic attempts at nation-building, which started in the late 
Ottoman era and intensified with the establishment of the republic. According to Liebisch-
Gümüş, Turkification is not just the policies that are non-violent and passively triggering 
assimilation that would result in a homogenization of the population; but also, actively 
changing the demography with forced migration, deportation, massacres, etc. (2020). 
Gellman lists the Turkification policies, some of which include changes in the education 
system and forced resettlement (2016).  Bali also underlines changes in education and 
adds Turkification of names and surnames following the 1934 Law of Family Names, and 
                                                
27 For an oral history/ documentary novel regarding Anatolian Greeks’ experiences of population 
exchange, see Kemal Yalçın’s “The Consigned Dowry” (Emanet Çeyiz).  
28For an article by the same author in English which covers a summary of the topics he delves into 
in the book see also Ünlü, 2016.  
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especially underlines Turkification of the economy through the Capital Tax of 1942 
(2006)29. Even the physical reconstruction of cities such as the cosmopolitan Istanbul was 
used as tools of Turkification (Akpınar, 2015). In the early periods of Turkification, during 
the time of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), educational changes and symbolic moves to assert 
Turkishness were visible (Uğuş, 2016). The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
marked violent Turkification moves, such as massacres and forced resettlements of 
Armenians and Syriacs (Liebish-Gümüş, 2020; Protner, 2018).  
 In order to understand Turkification in detail, briefly looking at the historical context 
of these policies will be useful. Late Ottoman times were marked by intellectuals’ efforts 
to come up with different sets of ideologies to keep the empire intact. Akçura’s great 
reference article on the issue, “The Three Types of Policies” examined these ideologies 
in a chronological order namely Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. His analysis 
describes a pragmatic and solution-oriented approach to maintain the empire. He 
analyses Ottomanism, which is the unity of all Ottoman nations under a shared Ottoman 
identity; and Islamism, unity of all Muslims under the Ottoman rule, and how and why they 
failed. His arguments followed with Turkism: asserting that Turkification would achieve a 
homogenous population and a possible reconnection with other Turkic groups outside of 
Anatolia (Uğuş, 2016; Ersoy et al. 2010). Ziya Gökalp, another prominent figure in the 
theorization of Turkification, underlined three main aims to create the Turkish nation, which 
is also the name of his very influential long essay “Turkification, Islamization, and 
Modernization”. According to Nefes, Gökalp’s approach to nationhood stressed the 
importance of shared cultural values including language and morality. He saw religion 
(Islam) to be the infrastructure creating this cultural tie (2018). For Gökalp, modernization 
was also a key element of nation-building, especially because of the presence of including 
non-Turkish Muslims. Gökalp believed that Kurdish people could be assimilated into the 
Turkish nation with the eradication of the feudal system in Kurdish lands and by providing 
education (Nefes, 2018).   
 The partial assimilation of descendants of Vranovcians could be explained with 
Gökalp’s theory; as he thought religion was the main infrastructure of culture while creating 
room for the assimilation of groups through modernization and laicism. Therefore, any 
threat to modernization and secularism would endanger the relationship between culture 
                                                
29 For another academic work that focuses on Turkification of the economy, see Öz, 2019 “Les 
politiques de la turquification et l'accumulation primitive des Musulmans-Turcs par depossession 
des minorites non musulmanes: exemple d'Edirne” Master’s Dissertation at Galatasaray University.  
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and civilization that lies in the heart of Gökalp’s analysis. Both Akçura and Gökalp were 
important figures politically on the foundation of the Turkish Republic and influenced the 
policymakers.  
 Turkification cannot be fully understood without examining the class position of the 
novice republic. While having the newly established revolutionary Soviets close to their 
borders, Turkey was determined to build a capitalist economy. Therefore, a unification of 
its population through their class characteristics, or unifying different nations stronger than 
the created identity of Turkishness was viewed as a threat to the Republic. In the 
Constitution of 1924; classes among society were declared “abolished and forbidden,”30 
at the same time all citizens were declared to be Turks.  The creation of a Turkish national 
identity would have homogenized the population as a single nation while preventing 
homogenization to be established in class terms.   
 The international community during the early stages of the Republic was indifferent 
to or even pleased with the Turkification movements of the Republic. There are a couple 
of cases where we can see the confirmation of these policies. First of all, under the 
Lausanne Treaty, non-Turkish Muslim groups were not defined as minorities (Bali, 2006). 
Again, the same treaty allowed the “population exchange” between Greece and Turkey 
on the basis of religion.31 Lastly, as examined by Liebish-Gümüş with petition cases from 
Turkey, the League of Nations prioritized the sovereignty of the Republic over minority 
rights (Liebish-Gümüş, 2020).   
 For the case of Vranovcians, local Turks distrusted their religious ties, thus leaving 
their Turkishness always open to debate. This situation created a vicious circle in which 
Balkan immigrants were seen as not Turkish enough because they were not Muslim 
enough and they were seen as not Muslim enough because they were not Turkish enough. 
                                                
30 “Madde 69.- Türkler kanun karşısında eşittirler ve ayrıksız kanuna uymak ödevindedirler. Her 
türlü grup, sınıf, aile ve kişi ayrıcalıkları kaldırılmıştır ve yasaktır.” Translation by Earle, 1925: 
Article 69: All Turks are equal before the law and obliged to respect the law. All privileges of 
whatever description claimed by groups, classes, families and individuals are abolished and 
forbidden.  
31 The first article of the Lausanne Peace Treaty VI. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek 
and Turkish Populations Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923 states “As from the 1st May, 1923, 
there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion 
established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek 




The frustration of this exclusion was crystalized in the slur gavur. As one of my participants 
expresses it:  
They used to call our people ‘gavur’. Huh! Actually, they (first-generation) 
came to Turkey because they were Muslims, but as they did not speak 
Turkish, they were gavur.  
From a theoretical perspective, I prefer the term Turkification as a more appropriate way 
of describing the way the state went about building a post-Ottoman Empire Turkish nation 
than the Turkishness Contract. The main reason I find the Turkishness Contract not 
theoretically appealing is that the word “contract” gives primary importance to the acts of 
individuals, implying a negotiated consent and overlooking structural components of 
nation-building. Ünlü focuses mostly on the agency of individuals to become Turkish by 
performing Turkishness as if the individual lives in a vacuum and does not experience the 
consequences of material and social structures around them. Furthermore, he sustains 
this argument with his way of seeing Turkishness as a privilege system apart from social 
class. Unlu’s theoretical shortcomings due to implementation of theoretical framework in 
Whiteness Studies to the case of Turkey are very well analyzed by Ağartan (Ağartan, 
2012). According to Ağartan, examining Turkishness as existential expressions of 
individuals such as ways of seeing, knowing, learning, or having the privilege of choosing 
not to learn is not commensurate with Whiteness. Parallel with ways of being White is 
examined in Whiteness Studies might lead to individualization of the problem of 
racialization; which is actually deeply structural, the Turkishness Contract might end up 
being not very useful as a tool to deconstruct racism and discriminations against 
minorities. The concept of Turkification, on the other hand, emphasizes structure over the 
individual agency as it is critical to nation-building; and therefore, is more useful to analyze 
the relationship between capitalism and nationhood which later has the potential of giving 
the sufficient tools to fight against racisms.32 Furthermore, Turkification has the potential 
to examine how discrimination and exclusion, especially when it is produced structurally 
as with the attempts of the ruling class and supported with the individual acts, such as in 
this case the slur of gavur going hand in hand with the state’s campaign of language 
oppression,33 had affected the acceptance of Turkish identity by the non-Turkish groups. 
                                                
32 For analysis of relation between capitalism and nationhood, see Wood, 1999; Wood, 2003 and 
Akbulut, 2014. 
33 Most of the participants remember the “Citizen! Speak Turkish.” campaign which I discussed in 
chapter 3. 
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 Despite my general criticisms of the concept of a Turkishness Contract, I, 
nonetheless, find it useful for analyzing a non-Turkish group’s assimilation to Turkish 
society. The three conditions of the Turkishness Contract together have the potential to 
explore nearly all dimensions of Turkish nationhood. The first condition of the contract, 
religion, has the potential to explain the immigration of non-Turkish Muslims from the 
Balkans to Turkey as they were seen to be of “Turkish descent and culture.” Additionally, 
the population exchange between Turkey and Greece was solely based on religion as the 
immigration criterion. The second condition, not recognizing non-Muslim groups and even 
denying their oppression in Anatolia when combined with the first condition has the 
potential to explain how non-Turkish Muslim groups, and especially in the case of the focal 
group, have created an identity of Turkishness through embracing their Muslimness as 
their Turkishness, and vice versa. The dual relationship between Islam and Turkishness 
is seen in the case of immigrants on several occasions, the slur gavur being the textbook 
example. Earlier in the chapter, I noted that one of the participants claimed that the group 
was actually ethnically Turkish. The effect of this claim was to create a stronger tie with 
Turkishness, as the tie Islam creates for the community is questionable in the eyes of the 
local people. Furthermore, that would give them room to escape from their lack of 
knowledge of the Turkish language as those nomadic Turkic groups are believed to have 
settled in the Balkans hundreds of years before the Ottoman conquest and blended into 
the locals of that region. Another example of such attempts on creating stronger ties with 
Turkishness is a common origin myth among the second generation that indicates the 
groups’ roots to Karamanids Dynasty34, as they were one of the Turkic dynasties ruled in 
Anatolia and later resettled by the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans when they lost power 
to Ottomans35. Overall, Ünlü’s contribution to debates around Turkishness is valuable 
despite theoretical deficiencies when it comes to analyzing structural and economic ties 
of nationhood. I find them suitable for explaining the different approaches towards 
Turkishness between the generations of immigrants.   
 I have mainly covered the ways in which first and second generations adopted a 
Turkish identity through this discussion.  In the third generation, there are two different 
                                                
34 There are significant number of people who immigrated from Balkans or still live there who indeed 
has ancestors from Karamanids resettlement, the main group of people are known as Yörüks. They 
are of Turkic origin and share similar cultural traits with people who are currently living in the regions 
once ruled by Turkish beyliks (for further investigation of Yörüks, see İnalcık, 2014). 
35 For a detailed work on forced resettlement in early Ottoman Empire, see Hooper, 2003.  
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approaches on that, the reasons for this differentiation are first; their coming of age was 
in a different political atmosphere, and second; the young generations witnessing of the 
Turkishness Crisis, resulted in their attachment to the Turkish identity to be somehow 
distorted. I explore the younger generations’ relation with Turkishness in detail at the end 
of the chapter. What was unique for the older members of the third generation who are 
now in their early 40s is that they became adults in the 1990s which is strongly 
remembered with the outcomes of transition to neoliberalism; end of the Cold War and 
rising discourse of globalization. Effects of these world events are quite visible in Tayfun’s 
words:  
No longer I feel like an immigrant, no longer… I also started to think 
globally, I see myself as a world citizen. I do not have a local understanding, 
a fascistic approach. I feel like I am more connected to the world and I am 
a world citizen. I also don’t like local music, I listen sometimes, and even 
though I am capable of dancing to the local music, I don’t have much 
enthusiasm for it. I feel like I am a Turkish person connected to the world. 
I listen to a lot of foreign music, I like it more. 
 Another important factor for older members of the third generation’s attachment to 
Turkishness is that their parents were born in the village and came to Turkey as children. 
One result is that they experienced discrimination and exclusion, and the memories of that 
pain affected the way they raised their children. For example, Burcu, who sees herself as 
Turkish before other attachments, states that her father prohibited the use of Macedonian 
in the household, as he was ridiculed because of his accent when he was a child. Those 
kinds of self-censorship might have led to a rupture within the immigrant identity and 
triggered the building of Turkish identity in older members of the third generation. 
Furthermore, these older members of the third generation were young adults in the 1990s, 
a decade remembered for political turbulence and assassinations in Turkey, and silencing 
of discussion of earlier atrocities, including the 1980 coup d’etat. All of these elements 
combined might have led the older members of the third generation to create stronger ties 
with Turkish identity and abandon immigrantness. There could be personal reasons that 
accelerated attachment to Turkishness, such as in the case of Burcu it could also be in 
relation to their occupation as a principal in an elementary school, similar to her father’s 
career as a state official in the education system. Due to their close relation to the state 
as officials, they might end up developing identities that are mutually benefiting, both for 
them and the state, as loyal Turkish citizens.  
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 As I have explored how and why the older third-generation immigrants have a 
tendency to embrace Turkish identity and do not see immigrantness as their main identity, 
I now will explore what has been changed and make younger third generations in my 
sample group more attached to immigrant identity and observably distant from Turkish 
identity.  Again, the epistemological framework shaped by Ünlü is helpful in exploring the 
changing material conditions. In order to understand younger generations’ embrace of the 
immigrant identity, one must clearly examine the Turkishness Crisis. According to Ünlü, 
the Turkishness Crisis is the inability of keeping the negative elements of Turkishness 
intact, such as consciously or unconsciously not learning about Kurds and non-Muslims 
of Anatolia. He underlines that the reason behind this crisis is due to the rising power of 
the Kurdish Movement since the late sixties. In his words, he elaborates the crisis as “the 
ones out of the contract pushed the ones within the contract to see themselves” (Ünlü, 
2018, p. 286). Especially after the Gezi Movement when the youth started to realize how 
the mainstream media was heavily influenced or suppressed by the government and 
mainstream ideologies, the Turkishness Crisis deepened (Protner, 2018). For the younger 
third generations, Gezi Movement was important as they came out of age in that era, and 
for most of them, it was probably the most impactful political event of their young 
adulthood. This environment made younger third generations more open to embracing 
their once seen as secondary identities, compared to the older third generations in part 
because they, like their grandparents felt abandoned by, or at least distant from, the 
Turkish state.   
 Ünlü describes the Turkishness Crisis as originating with the increasing power of 
the ones out of the contract, specifically the Kurdish Movement. However, he does not 
examine whether the scope of some of the criteria of the contract was in danger of crisis 
or not. The first criterion of the contract, being Muslim and preferably Sunni Muslim, was 
the main tie of the first-generation immigrants to Turkishness. No matter whether the first-
generation immigrants were religious or not, their religious association gave them a path 
to embrace Turkishness and build their Turkish identity around that religious connection, 
even though it meant giving up some other parts of their heritage such as language. In 
order to understand the effects of the Turkishness Crisis on younger generation 
immigrants, I speculate that there is another crisis occurring in Turkey, which could be 
named the Muslimness Crisis. As I examined earlier, the relationship between 
Turkishness and Islam was prevalent in the foundation of the republic. This relationship 
was emphasized again in several points of contemporary Turkish history, such as the 
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Menderes period in 1950s and later, right after the coup d’etat of September 1980. The 
seeds of the Muslimness crisis were sowed with the 1980 coup d’etat as it was the main 
event that led Turkey towards a more political Islamist atmosphere, though traces of 
conservative and what could be counted as political Islamists’ movements could be found 
as early as the 1960s36. With the Justice and Development Party becoming the main 
power in the government, as the party concentrated power day by day and became 
oppressive, the first criterion of the contract became much more visible and stricter. Before 
the normalization of oppression of political Islam, a self-proclaimed Sunni Muslim identity 
was enough to be under the coverage of the contract. Especially as Turkey’s image as a 
secular country created room for individuals to experience religion in their own ways, even 
though it also required them to forego religious expressions like wearing the hijab and 
heterodoxy. The younger third generations’ experience was somehow similar to the first 
generations regarding their tie to Turkishness; as they were not seeing Muslim enough 
due to their secular ways of living, they felt that their Turkishness was also under question, 
too. Furthermore, as they have already had links to other identities other than Turkishness, 
such as Macedonian immigrant, they find room to escape from that circle of questioning. 
This might be one of the reasons why the younger generation of immigrants have a 
tendency to identify as an immigrant before Turkish or Muslim.   
 Another important element to consider is how flexible both second and third 
generations on changing unconsciously and/or consciously their presentation of different 
identities. An interviewee who openly rejected being an immigrant counted themselves as 
an immigrant while explaining the relations between first generation immigrants and locals; 
whereas another interviewee who sees themselves as immigrant underlined their 
Turkishness only when they were asked if they see themselves as Turkish, so only when 
there is a presence of authority. I would argue both of these changes carry unconscious 
and conscious elements, and this fluidity and interchangeability of the layered identities 
will be examined in detail in the next chapter.  
                                                
36 An early example of the political Islamist movement in Turkey is visible in the transition of the 
National Turkish Student Union (In Turkish: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) from a secular radical 
nationalistic union to a conservative, Islamist nationalistic approach during the late 60s. It should 
be noted that this transition was accompanied by a radical anti-communist stand (Öztürk, 2016). 
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Chapter 5.  
 Throughout the thesis, I have presented narratives of second and third-generation 
descendants of Vranovcians about the identities they claim; namely immigrant, 
Turkishness, and Muslim, and the circular relationship between the last two. In this 
chapter, I primarily focus on this intersection and complexity of identities and how the 
expressions of identity differ between the narratives of second and third generations. I will 
analyze the multiplicity in three layers. I start by examining the fluidity of these identities 
and the ways in which my research participants shifted in their assertions of identity. I 
closely analyze the narratives of the participants in which this fluidity becomes visible. I 
continue this chapter by exploring what I call "fluency of fluidity", where I interrogate 
whether or not the momentary identity fixes/changes in participants were conscious. 
Lastly, I examine the coexistence of identities that differentiate Vranovcians from local 
Turks, such as good citizenship and Europeanness as opposed to the identities 
underlining their similarities, with giving emphasis on differences in generations.  
 Wedding ceremonies are a good place to observe the fluidity of identities among 
descendants of Vranovcians. Marriage, as a rite of passage, includes numerous rituals 
which have an impact on the reproduction of the accepted identities by respective families. 
Weddings serve as an occasion where different generations come together both in the 
sense of gathering and also in the sense of belonging and reproducing the ethnic identity 
(Levitt cited in Woźniak-Bobińska 2018: 2688). Woźniak-Bobińska adds that the 
appearance of new rituals associated with the host country to the wedding ceremonies of 
migrant families can be read as the "putting down of roots in a new country".  
 In the summer of 2019, I attended several wedding ceremonies of third-generation 
immigrants. In some cases, both members of the couple were third-generation immigrants, 
but marriages between descendants of Vranovcians and local Turks also occurred, as I 
explained in Chapter four. One such wedding ceremony between a third-generation 
immigrant and a Turkish woman was full of signifiers of different sorts of identities. At this 
event, the groom was my distant cousin. He was marrying his long-term fiancé, who was 
from the Black Sea region. The two had met and become friends while at university. Both 
of my cousin’s parents are second-generation immigrants, and he is the first person in his 
family to marry non-Vranovcian. The musical playlist of the wedding party was chosen to 
entertain both families. It included Macedonian folkloric songs for the groom's family and 
Black Sea Türküs, the Turkish folkloric songs for the bride’s side. 
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 The decision to include traditional songs from both families’ traditions is not 
unusual, but the couple’s musical selections were not limited to folkloric tunes. Instead of 
a mainstream wedding march such as "A Midsummer Night's Dream" or "Here Comes the 
Bride", the couple chose a political march unrelated to weddings as their entrance music. 
The song they chose was the "March of İzmir", which has become a symbol for the secular 
opposition to the government in Turkey. As if this was not already a very bold choice, the 
couple's celebration party after the formal reception included a somewhat bizarre (to me) 
and newly invented ritual. Turkish flags were distributed to the guests and the same march 
was played again. Unlike me, the other guests did not seem particularly surprised and 
started to wave their paper flags and sing along with the march. Afterwards, I confirmed 
with some of the guests that they had never seen such an act before.  
 Taking a closer look at the march would relieve that the couple’s choice of the 
March of İzmir and their invention of this new ritual was meant to convey a message to 
both families. Even though the historical background of the march carries many 
controversies37 regarding whether it is authentically about Atatürk and the Liberation War 
or about the Caucasus campaign in WWI and leaders of the Committee of Union and 
Progress; one element that is widely accepted is that the popularity of the march from the 
early 20th century has increased significantly among the secular and Kemalist groups 
within recent years. The lyrics of the march uphold a patriotic and Kemalist message; as 
the chorus goes “Long live Mustafa Kemal Pasha!  I will sacrifice myself for the lovely 
homeland.” One possibility behind the selection of the march was to reassure the groom’s 
family that the bride and her family shared Kemalist political views similar to many 
Izmirians. This could have been important because of the dominant stereotypes of Black 
Sea residents as socially conservative and in full support of the AKP government. At the 
same time, the song served a somewhat different purpose for the groom, signifying his 
and his family’s patriotism and allegiance to the Turkish state, even as half of the wedding 
celebration was spent dancing to Macedonian folk songs.   
                                                
37 For further discussion of those controversies regarding the history of the march, see news articles 
by soL portal https://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/geh-mars-gehey-alafranga-duzd-i-gama-vurdular-
pranga-bir-izmir-marsi-karmasasi-184593, gazete duvar https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/kultur-
sanat/2018/12/02/izmir-marsini-besteleyen-rum and for an English article on popularization of the 
march see the euronews article https://www.euronews.com/2017/04/12/old-song-revived-in-
turkey-as-anthem-of-a-modern-nation-opposed-to-erdogan  
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 Whether the choice of this march as an entrance song for the couple and a part of 
the wedding party was suggested by the bride or the groom is not clear. However, the 
guests were very quick to start waving the paper flags and sing along to the march with 
patriotic excitement. It was very interesting for me to see the shift from traditional dances 
and singing along to Macedonian songs even by children to this patriotic scene within 
minutes. Both of these literal performances of identities show that immigrants reflect the 
fluidity within the identities they carry.  
 There is no clear-cut division between the varied identities I have observed within 
my participants; whether second or third-generation. Furthermore, most of the time, those 
identities might be visible simultaneously or the switch from one to the other might be very 
smooth and quick. In the case of the wedding example, the sharp change from dancing 
and singing to Macedonian folkloric songs to March of Izmir didn’t baffle any of the guests, 
as for most of them both of those instances are a reflection of their simultaneous identity 
as a Macedonian immigrant and a secular Turkish citizen.    
 Rutherford’s definition of identification would be very useful to understand the 
fluidity of identities. He writes: 
Identification, if it is to be productive, can never be with some static and 
unchanging object. It is an interchange between self and structure, a 
transforming process. If the object remains static, ossified by tradition, or 
isolated by a radically changing world, if its theoretical foundations cannot 
address that change, then its culture and politics lose their ability to 
innovate. Its symbolic language can only conjure up the past, freezing us 
in another moment. (1990: 14) 
Exploring his analysis of identity in the article “A Place Called Home”, I have interpreted 
four main aspects of identity (Rutherford, 1990). First of all, as in the quote above, he 
underlines that identities that born out of difference and in relation with an “other” are never 
static and they are always in the making. Secondly, when different aspects of one’s 
identities are combined, the outcome will be more than just the sum up of all aspects, 
which he calls articulation following Gramsci. Here, intersectionality would also be helpful 
to comprehend this phenomenon. Crenshaw (1991) deployed the term to analyze the 
violence faced by women of color within the intersection of race, gender, and class; and 
the inadequate policy replies to the situation. Following that the term had been generally 
used to refer to a person’s or a group’s social location shaped by multiple social factors of 
power; such as their race, gender, ethnicity, religion, immigration background, etc. (Read 
and Eagle, 2014). Brah and Phoenix also underline that intersectionality is useful in 
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exploring how these different dimensions are not separable in one’s life and act in a 
“mutually constitutive” way (cited in Corlett and Mavin, 2014: 261).  The example given by 
Walby et. al makes it clearer to see this inseparability and how one affects the other; as 
being a Black woman is not the sum of being a woman and being Black (cited in Corlett 
and Mavin, 2014: 263). Thirdly, he underlines the importance of past and historical 
conditions in this articulation process, as the identities are not articulated in a bubble but 
within the social, economic, and political atmosphere of the given time. Lastly, due to all 
of these aspects; reaching to a final, concrete, and the well-established end result in the 
process of articulation of identity is not an achievable goal. I will explore this last aspect 
later in the chapter by deploying Bauman’s approach to identity.   
 The blurred lines on the varied identities of immigrants create an environment 
where shifts between identities are sometimes performed in a very subtle way, so subtly 
that I recognized it only after reading the interview transcripts several times. For example, 
Burcu reported that she does not see herself as an immigrant. Instead, she situates herself 
closely within a Turkish identity. At the same time, she expresses her commitment to 
continuing family traditions which she explains as a consequence of her immigrantness. 
While explaining her “essence” as Turkish, she also states a desire to connect more with 
her “roots” in Vranovci and expresses a desire to learn Macedonian. In another example, 
Kadri used the term “homeland” (memleket in Turkish) interchangeably to refer to both 
Turkey and Vranovci throughout his interview, and sometimes as part of the same thought. 
…we came to our homeland [Turkey], that’s why we didn’t get it [state 
support]. Immigrants from Bulgaria, they were facing great oppression 
there… but we are  Muslims so this was not acceptable, that’s why we 
return to our homeland and we were not faced with such problems. But we 
didn’t know about “renting” when we were in our homeland [Vranovci]. 
In this statement where he explains the lack of state support for immigrants who came 
with the Free Migrant Agreement from his point of view, he uses the word homeland to 
refer to Turkey. However, right after that, he starts to talk about how the concept of “rent” 
was foreign to the immigrants, he uses homeland to mean Vranovci. Yet another example 
of this subtle shift is visible when Naci analyses the current political atmosphere in Turkey,  
… The political environment in contemporary Turkey has othering, 
oppression on religion, discrimination… These are at very dangerous 
levels, and also people forgot about the reforms of Atatürk, the revolution 
laws are not accepted anymore. The violence against women… The 
massacre of nature and the environment… The damage to life and 
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culture… I mean, people like us [immigrants] know the importance of such 
things, so we are more aware, and we try to protect it more. We know where 
we came from, and we know what kind of process that was. We truly know 
all of the sacrifices needed just to survive. Our mothers, our fathers… Most 
of them died on the roads due to several sicknesses like malaria… On the 
ships, on the train… some of them even came by foot… This means we 
paid the price… Not knowing this or denying this would be ungrateful. It 
would be denying your own reason to be alive. Every person has a 
personality essence, a standing. You live your life, you’re born, and you’ll 
die. What you do between birth and death is your worldview. If you don’t 
spend your life with dignity, if your worldview is not like that, your humanity 
would be in question, like that would be a whole another debate. 
Naci ties his immigrant identity and his family’s difficult experiences as immigrants with his 
political standpoint as a Kemalist and social democrat. This allows him to connect to 
Turkishness through good citizenship. He even goes as far as to establish his worldview 
as a fundamental element of his self, his identity.   
 Good citizenship as a tool to connect to Turkishness is also examined by Beltan, 
who conducted her ethnographic research with Turkish immigrants from Macedonia who 
settled in Turkey in the late 1980s. Beltan analyzed their narratives to understand how 
they defined “proper citizenship” (2006). Besides the association between Turkishness 
and Muslimness that I examined in earlier chapters, Beltan’s participants raised what she 
labeled qualifications of proper citizenship. Some of the qualifications listed by Beltan are 
“not being a burden on the state, serving the state and society with their professions, 
having a clean record both in Macedonia and Turkey” (2006, 50). Many of my participants, 
especially members of the second generation, also described good citizenship as a way 
that they differentiate themselves from the non-immigrants.  I would further argue that the 
over-adoption and internalization of good citizenship might be a sign that members of the 
second-generation, especially, emphasized their secular, social democratic values to 
achieve acceptance among the society. Muammer ties the proper citizenship values that 
are upheld within the community to their experience of being a minority in Yugoslavia; 
Being a minority is just different. Well, the people here do not know how 
much it matters to belong to a motherland. If a person is not from a minority, 
they don’t know the importance of motherland. That’s why we are different. 
From our community, you can’t find a traitor, everyone respects the 
motherland [Turkey]. Everyone pays their taxes, cleans their streets. We 
try not to be a burden on anyone. The reason behind these behaviors is 
that. We were a minority there [Macedonia]. 
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Similar sentiments were visible in the narratives of my father, Naci, and Kadri. Also, 
Tayfun, as an older member of the third generation, expressed similar ideas about 
citizenship. I should also note that all of these participants associated being hardworking 
with being a proper citizen.  
We had this mindset, respect your state. Respect the Turkish flag, respect 
rules, and regulations. Don’t fight with police, don’t steal. Be a good person 
and be a good citizen. Be clean and honest. Be hardworking. I am for 
example a very hardworking person. 
Tayfun’s expressions clearly summarize how proper citizenship is a part of the immigrant 
way of life, especially for second and older third generations. During the interview, several 
times Tayfun stated that he does not see himself as an immigrant. Close to the end of our 
interview, I asked him what differentiates the Vranovcian immigrant culture from local 
Turks, as sometimes he differentiated the two. He explained that meeting people from 
different cultures in Turkey caused him to stop identifying as an immigrant. Here, again, 
his understanding of proper citizenship plays a primary role in differentiating immigrants 
from local Turks.  
Well, I don’t see myself as an immigrant, but we have lots of differences 
[from locals]. Firstly, we are hardworking people. I feel that distinction a lot. 
We don’t have the understanding of playing unfairly. We work more than 
what we are capable of. We are not lazy, we don’t sleep a lot, we don’t eat 
a lot. We are vigorous people. We don’t consume much; we don’t waste 
stuff. These are the good traits that I gain from the immigrant culture. I 
never saw my grandma or my grandpa wasting something. We don’t throw 
things in the garbage if it’s still usable or edible. People just bite 
hamburgers and throw them here. We don’t do that. Tea, cigarettes, 
bread… I finish my plate and don’t waste anything. I know I have to use my 
belongings properly, in a clean way, etc. These traits came from poverty, I 
believe. Local people are lazy, they waste stuff. They are not very 
disciplined; they are often late to work. …. I always say that our trait of 
hardworking comes from us being immigrants. We know how to get in a 
queue, we know that we should arrange help for disabled people in hard 
circumstances. We help other people and forget about that. We don’t nag 
about us being helpful. We forgot our bits of help. I believe these traits are 
connected to being an immigrant. I don’t talk about whom I have helped. 
 Interestingly, good citizenship works as both a way to connect to Turkishness and 
as a way to differentiate immigrants from Turks. I examine the existence of such 
contradictions later in this chapter. Contrary to the subtleness of the examples I examined 
earlier, the flows from one identity to another were sometimes sharp and so overt that I 
found myself questioning whether those changes were conscious decisions on the part of 
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my interlocutors to appear more or less of an immigrant. A very clear example of such 
abrupt change was in Işıl’s response to my question of her feelings regarding the word 
“Turkish”. Throughout our interview, she defined herself as an immigrant and sometimes 
even emphasized her “European roots”, so I was not expecting her narrative to be in 
parallel with Konya-Karaman mythos; 
Işıl:  Turkish? Well, when I talked to my grandpa, I never felt like 
I’m not a Turkish person. Because, they were taught while they 
were growing up, that we are Turkish, this was like planted in, 
that they were Turkish, like all the time. Yes, we are 
Macedonian, but also Turkish. They felt like they were 
connected to Turkey. For example, my grandpa always said 
that they immigrated to Macedonia from…. Where was that 
place? 
EA:  Konya, Karaman? 
Işıl:  (laughs) That they immigrated from Konya Karaman. So, we 
are from Konya.   
EA:  There is such a statement. 
Işıl:  Yes, so he was saying that they actually immigrated from Konya 
to Macedonia then back to Turkey. So, like when I say we are 
Turkish, we are like, already like that. 
Following that exchange in which Işıl said that her family originated in central Anatolia, I 
asked her which identities she feels the closest to herself, and the first one she listed was 
Turkish, followed by Macedonian. This drastic change in her identification was mind-
boggling and surprising for me and made me question whether she used the Karaman 
mythos which I explored in Chapter 4 to connect with the dominant culture’s approved 
identity consciously.  
 How can we understand these overt and dramatic shifts between immigrant and 
Turkish identities as well as the more subtle ones? Bauman suggests that the work of 
composing an identity (or identities) might look a bit like working on a jigsaw puzzle, but a 
puzzle with some of the pieces missing and the picture missing. According to Bauman, 
building a jigsaw puzzle a goals-oriented activity, but identity building is means-oriented 
(Bauman, 2004). In other words, while a person is building their identity, they use whatever 
pieces they have and cannot know what the result will be. Hence, the individual works to 
create a meaningful combination without knowing the outcome. In that sense, Bauman 
sees identity building as more like making a potpourri with the flowers from your garden 
than building a jigsaw puzzle. Therefore, the question of whether these shifts from one 
identity to another are conscious or unconscious loses its importance when one starts to 
see the process of building an identity as means oriented. As the end goal cannot be 
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predicted by the individual within the process, it is hard to assess which move signifies 
conscious selections, even by the individual themselves.   
 I observed the existence of a seemingly contradictory claim to be both immigrant 
and Turkish among members of both second and third generations.  This is something 
that Beltan also noted (2006). She underlines that immigrants articulate their identity 
through assertions of sameness with non-immigrants (Turkishness and Muslimness) and 
then re-articulate their identity through their differences. The latter is a reaction to the 
exclusion and discrimination they experience in Turkey (Beltan, 2006).  Similar to some of 
my participants, one of the ways that Beltan observes differences are used in identity 
formation is with the immigrants’ emphasis on their “Europeanness”.  Beltan’s participants 
situated their Europeanness in opposition to the locals’ Anatolianness, and used the 
dichotomy to emphasize differences in both their physical features – white, blonde, thin, 
tall versus darker-skinned, short, etc. – and in mindsets – modern / “enlightened” vs. 
backward (2006, 118-119).  I observed very similar tendencies in my participant group, 
which I label “orientalism” (Said 1978).  
 Orientalism, according to Edward Said, is the gaze of the “Occidental” mind, 
depicting and building the understanding of the “Orient” and creating a dichotomy between 
the West and the East. Westerners/Occidentals are understood as “us”, rational, virtuous, 
mature, normal, strong, while Orientals are “them”, irrational, depraved (fallen) childlike, 
different and weak. Inherent in the dichotomy between West and East, according to Said, 
is that Orientalists define and shape the Orient first, then characterize West as the 
opposite (Said, 1978). This kind of hierarchical othering is present in the ways that several 
of my participants described the difference between themselves and non-immigrants. 
Tayfun, for example, adopts an Orientalist gaze when he compares the ways that locals 
and immigrants enact good citizenship: 
… Our principles are not important for them. They don’t care about being 
lazy, or being late to work, or being unfair and unjust. To us, these are 
important things. You have to be hardworking, clean, and be sparing. You 
should be a good citizen, respect the rules… As we mingled with those 
kinds of people a lot, I even started to swear. When I was a kid, I remember 
my mom beat me because I said ‘bastard’. Just because of that word! I 
didn’t know it was a swear, and my mom beat me. 
A similar contrast between local and immigrant people is seen in my father’s hyperbolic 
description of the difference between our community and locals, too: 
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They are dirty people. We taught them to be clean. Thanks to us, I mean. 
Also, we taught them to live together with other people, those people are 
not open to discussions, they pick a fight immediately. In our community, 
we don’t fight. We don’t have murderers. No smugglers, no one committing 
murder. I mean, our elderly taught us to be honest, and we continue our 
lives as honest people. I tell people that I am an immigrant in any place I 
am in. 
 In contrast to Said’s ascription of power to the Orientalists, I call these comparisons 
“orientalism by the other”, as the marginalized group posits itself as morally and 
intellectually superior to the dominant group.  This might be a response to their parents’ 
or grandparents’ marginalization. As from the marginalized position the immigrants cannot 
produce knowledge on the party that they see as “them”, local Turks, they might have 
reproduced the Occidental prejudices about Turkish people being barbaric. Most of the 
conversations I had with the other participants regarding what makes them different from 
local people including the similar dichotomy that is seen in an Orientalist perspective, both 
in the second and third generation. Some other examples from the interviews include one 
participant explaining the real owners of İzmir as Levantines and immigrants, stressing the 
Europeanness of both parties, and especially emphasizing their roles as vanguards of 
civilization. Another participant mentioned the popularity of immigrants’ wedding rituals 
among non-immigrants people, as those rituals look more “European”. This gaze they 
adopted positioned them as European or Western and therefore superior to “barbaric” and 
“backward” locals. Orientalism by the other contrasts with the Turkishness Contract 
discussed in Chapter 4; hence, it builds a tie between an immigrant identity and a 
Macedonian identity; acting as a bridge for second and third generations for their 
connection with immigrantness.  
 I should note that all four of my third-generation participants showed Orientalist 
tendencies while explaining the differences between immigrants and non-immigrants and 
also on defining their community. This should be considered together with Turkey’s 
changing international politics from following a path to be an EU member to be a regional 
power within the Middle East.  
 My sample size is too small to produce an overarching analysis of why each 
generation performs different facades of being an immigrant; however, the patterns I have 
observed point to some interesting possibility. I speculate that second-generation 
participants tend to build their ties with Turkishness through not just the factors I examined 
in Chapter four, but also through assertions and enactments of good citizenship. Third-
generation participants, on the other hand, regard good citizenship as a way to 
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differentiate themselves from the locals and combine that with claims to “Europeanness”.  
The third generation was able to do that as they spend their adulthood after the Cold War, 
during a time when Macedonia started to be seen as part of Europe, at least nominally. 
On the contrary, for the second-generation Vranovci is a part of Yugoslavia, and that also 
gives a clue on why they emphasize good citizenship more than the third generation. 
Tayfun, who generally responded similarly to the second generations, explained some of 
the good citizenship behaviors, such as planning the day and being hardworking as 
"acquisition of socialism". On top of the existence of contradictory identities among 
individuals, different generations might deploy similar attributes to situate themselves in 
different positions; as they come to develop their identities in different zeitgeists.  
 The four elements of identity I elaborated within the chapter; namely dynamism, 
intersectionality, being affected by historical conditions, and being mean-oriented more 
than goals-oriented provides the explanation behind the complexity and contradictory 
aspects of my participants’ presentations of their identities. Furthermore, the embrace of 
contradictory identities by different generations of Vranovcians shows how the process of 
immigration might continue to affect further generations, together with the sociopolitical 
atmosphere of the period. One should remember that all three possible reasons behind 
younger generations’ re-adoption of the immigrant identity are interconnected. For 
example, if Turkishness Crisis did not deepen, Muslimness Crisis would not occur and it 
could have even worked the other way, resulting in solidifying a Sunni Muslim identity in 
immigrant youth as a way to underline their Turkishness. Furthermore, orientalist 
tendencies in both second and third generations reflect that the Turkishness and 
Muslimness Crises made them feel left out of the contract. In other words, they were never 
fully embraced by the Turkification process, never really made to feel Turkish.  Thus, they 
look elsewhere for attachments. 
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Chapter 6.  
 The story of Afro Turks is not widely known either in Turkey or around the globe. 
Mustafa Olpak, the founder of Afrikalılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (African’s Culture, 
Solidarity and Charity Association) and the author of the book “Kenya-Girit-İstanbul Köle 
Kıyısından Insan Biyografileri” starts his book about Afro Turks with his interpretation of 
generations: “Birinci kuşak yaşar, İkinci kuşak reddeder, Üçüncü kuşak araştırır…” (The 
first-generation experiences, second generation denies and the third generation 
investigates). His words resonated with me as I found myself investigating the 
intergenerational effects of immigration on my generation. By no means, I am comparing 
mine or my family’s experiences with the experiences of Afro Turks that include slavery 
under the Ottoman Empire, but I believe my motivation behind this thesis is explained 
better than my own words by his prologue.  
 With this thesis, I worked to build an understanding of why and how the third-
generation descendants of Vranovcians still embrace an immigrant identity, and in which 
ways this identity is visible in their narratives. I analyzed the narratives of the second and 
third generations within the framework of historical and contemporary sociopolitical 
atmosphere and used the second generation’s narratives to compare and contrast them 
with the third-generation. While the effects of historical conditions of immigration are still 
visible, it was striking to see that each generation deploy similar stories differently to 
articulate their identities. The main reason for this differentiation is the differences in the 
sociopolitical atmosphere of each generation and sometimes even within generations, age 
groups.  
 The name of this thesis “Vintage (of) Identities” underlines the two ways the third 
generation is engaging with their immigrant identities. Firstly, immigrantness is a vintage 
identity for them. Just like in the case of vintage item collectors, the third-generation’s 
immigrant identity is a tool of distinction for them, through relating with the past. Secondly, 
vintage as in the meaning of vine-harvest, explains the process of winemaking. Wine as 
a delicate drink is very much affected by the climate, soil type, that year’s specific weather 
conditions, so on and so forth. That is why even if the producers use the exact same seeds 
in the exact same earth type, they will end up with unique wines every year. Identity 
formation resembles this process which I explained as being mean-oriented in the fifth 
chapter. Even though they might have the same seed, in this case, immigration of the first 
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generation; second and third generations ended in different outcomes due to differences 
in sociopolitical environment.  
 Starting with Chapter 2, I focused on one side of what the third generation reflects 
in their narratives regarding their identities in each chapter.  To do that, I started with laying 
out the historical conditions that led to the immigration of the first generation; but then I 
have changed the focus of my lenses to how the second and third generations reflect their 
parents’ or grandparents’ decision. This flow of analysis helped me see the differences of 
Vranovcians from the urban-Turks through the transmitted memories. Furthermore, 
analysis of the narratives of participants around the initial immigration showed how much 
most of them saw immigration inevitable for their community; especially because of the 
impoverishment of the village and similar fates of out-migration in the nearby villages. This 
mindset of the participants has led immigration to be an inseparable part of their familial 
history and their identity.  
 I followed the timeline of immigration while analyzing my participants’ narratives. 
That is why in Chapter 3 I delved into what my participants shared with me regarding the 
first generation’s first experiences in the new country, how most of them ended up in Izmir, 
and what their relations with locals, non-immigrants were like in the new city. This allowed 
me to find out the boundary markers that differentiate immigrants from locals, namely 
cleaning habits, language, and marital ties. Even though second and third generations 
only sometimes followed these boundary markers, the narrative they created around these 
practices allowed them to distinguish themselves from the locals and to identify with being 
an immigrant without the experience of immigrating from one place to another by 
themselves.  
 In Chapter 4, I started the debate with how Torbesh identity, being Muslim 
Macedonian, was forgotten among younger generations due to its pejorative baggage and 
mainly focused on the relationship between Turkish and Muslim identities and their 
relations with the immigrant identity. It is striking to see how the locals’ distrust around the 
religiosity of my focus group affected their ties with Turkishness and make their 
Turkishness also questionable.  In Chapter 5, I changed my focus to how my participants 
presented complex, sometimes conflicting identities in their narratives. As I mentioned 
earlier, the same behaviours; such as good citizenship; are used differently by different 
generations; sometimes for shortening the distance with Turkishness and sometimes for 
complete differentiation from the locals, non-immigrants, mainly Turks.  
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 Now, as my concluding remarks, I will go through several themes to delve into the 
question of when the immigrant subject no longer sees themselves as an immigrant; and 
becomes local. To fully grasp the presence or disappearance of immigrantness in the 
narratives of second and third generations; I will start by examining the identity in the time 
and space frame. Later, I will include immigrantness as weirdness in the discussion, with 
the definition used by Fisher (2016). Following the definition of weirdness, I will examine 
immigrantness as “not-belonging” and finalize the thesis with my last notes.  
 Immigration cuts the connection between the dimensions of time and space the 
individual finds themselves in. Mobility in the space disturbs the flow of time and the time 
in the home country slows down, nearly stops for the immigrant individual. Even if they try 
to keep their connections with the home country, their main ideas will tend to be from the 
times they were living there. This twisted relation between immigrant subject and time 
affects the upcoming generations as well, and as the narratives of immigration are 
transmitted, immigrantness as an identity is also transmitted within that relation of time. 
Immigrants' relation between space is also distorted, the movement makes the immigrant 
out of space in both home and host countries.  
 One of the definitions Fisher deploys to investigate weird is “which does not 
belong” (Fisher, 2016). In that sense, the immigrant is a weird subject. Immigrant finds 
themselves in an environment where their presence is seen as out of place. The 
immigrants’ presence is most of the time questioned, and reproduced by the locals in a 
manner that distorts the self of the immigrant to make them more familiar and less “weird”. 
A great example of the immigrant as weird is visible in the Fassbinder movie “Fear Eats 
the Soul” (1973). The movie is about a guest worker’s romantic relationship with an elderly 
German woman. In the movie, even the name of the main immigrant character is altered 
by local Germans to soften his weirdness.  
 In some instances, the presence of the weird, in our cases the immigrant, becomes 
grotesque. An example of that would be the language deficiencies of the immigrant leads 
to tragicomic scenes. Similar instances of weirdness were visible in the narratives of my 
participants as well. One example of such a scene was given by Tayfun: 
“My mom’s aunt, I mentioned about living in a triangle of Yugoslavia, 
Turkey, and Germany, she blended the three languages in one occasion, 
that’s a memory I want to share. She went to a Turkish bazaar, and asked 
for “tri kila kartoffel”. Tri, means three in Yugoslavian. Kilo, she said “kila” 
in her words, she knows it from Turkish but says in her accent, and kartoffel, 
means potatoes in German. She believed she said all of these in Turkish 
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to the stallholder, but it was a mix of three languages. So, the stallholder 
didn’t understand her.”  
The immigrant’s not belonging is not solely in relation to the host country, it is expanded 
to the home country as well. Especially after generations, the home country’s image 
transmits into a mystical land, that only some of the visual tokens are left. The village is 
no longer a territorial entity; but it is an artificial replica of the village in the minds of younger 
generations that even if you visit the territorial one, it will never be habitable again.  For 
example, Işıl, talked a lot about how she sees herself connected to the land, how she 
really wants to visit the village, and the “great plane tree”, which was once a mark in the 
village for a place for celebration. However, she also stated that the village “stayed the 
same” after the immigration, meaning it didn’t have any development and still the same 
rural village, lacking even basic infrastructure like plumbing. In her mind, even though the 
village was “her roots”, it was inhabitable because of these deficiencies of infrastructure. 
 Another aspect of not belonging to the home country depicts that even a 
speculative past where the migration did not happen is not comprehensible for the next 
generations. Most of the participants stated that even if the immigration to Turkey did not 
happen in the 50s, the village would still be empty today as the younger generations would 
eventually leave the village for employment or education opportunities in Europe, either 
during guest worker program to Germany or later.  
 The home country is frozen in time and it is only in the memories, and 
immigrantness is reproduced by the transmission of those memories for the younger 
generations. In a nation-state system with strict borders, the immigrant is doomed to 
belong in limbo, and where the territorial belongings are completely distorted for them. In 
that sense, as far as the narratives of immigrantness are shared among the generations, 
the weirdness of it is also transmittable. Even in the cases where the immigrant is seen 
as assimilated in the host country’s society, a distance between the immigrant and the 
non-immigrant could arise easily if the ground which the immigrant assimilated into shifts; 
such as the case examined in chapter four regarding the relations between Turkishness 
and Muslimness. The ontological dilemma the first generation finds themselves in is 
reproduced by the younger generations during the times the dominant culture pushed 
them to the margins of society.  
 What I have arrived at as a final result in this thesis through the analysis of my 
participants is that their narratives are mainly affected by the current sociopolitical 
atmosphere that they find themselves in. They interpret the experiences of their parents; 
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the immigration and the exclusion and discrimination they experience in Turkey, through 
the frames of their sociopolitical environment. The combination of these three factors; 
namely individuals’ own sociopolitical environment, first generation’s immigration, and 
discrimination, created a positionality for the younger generations to perform multiple and 
sometimes contradictory identities, such as Turkishness and immigrantness, even 
simultaneously. To summarize, the Marx quote from The Eighteenth Brumaire would be 
helpful; " Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past.” (Marx, 1852).  
 There are two areas I have identified where further research could be worthwhile 
on understanding narratives around immigrantness in the younger generations. Firstly, 
some of the boundary markers such as cleaning rituals and marital ties and the slur 
“karafatma” were all very much gendered. Therefore, research focusing on the role gender 
plays in the (re)creation of immigrantness within younger generations would be very 
fruitful. A second area where further research might be conducted is the third generation 
Vranovcians who attend university in North Macedonia. Even though I am aware of such 
phenomenon started to gain momentum, I couldn’t find anyone who studied in North 
Macedonia willing to participate in my research. Investigating these youth’s narratives 
around immigrantness would give different insights than my participants, as they see 
Macedonia as a place they could actually “return”.   
 Following the Syrian Refugee Crisis, the 2010s marked a change in Turkey’s 
position from a home country to a host country. The number of immigrants, refugees, and 
asylum seekers in Turkey who settle in the country without knowing any Turkish 
dramatically increased in the last decade. As this thesis focused on the younger 
generation narratives around immigrantness in a case where the first generation did not 
know any Turkish, I believe this thesis will also be beneficial to compare and contrast the 
situation for the younger generations of the new influx of immigrants in Turkey, in the 
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